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THE LONG GOODBYE: AFTER THE 
INNOCENCE MOVEMENT, DOES THE 
ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EVER 
END? 
LARA A. BAZELON* 
Inspired by the Innocence Movement, the American Bar Association 
has placed an unprecedented new obligation on defense counsel in the form 
of an “Innocence Standard.”  This new rule imposes an affirmative “duty 
to act” upon criminal defense attorneys who learn of newly discovered 
evidence that a former client may be innocent.   
 The new Standard, while well-intentioned, reconceives the 
traditional defense attorney function, creating an ethical parity between 
prosecutors and defense attorneys in wrongful conviction cases while 
overlooking the fact that the two sides play distinct and incompatible roles 
in our adversarial system.  While prosecutors must to seek the truth and 
administer justice, defense counsel’s obligation is to zealously defend her 
current client.  The Innocence Standard has the unintended effect of 
potentially destabilizing that primary and paramount relationship.  It may 
require counsel to place the interests of a former client above those of a 
current client.  It may expose counsel to allegations of ineffective assistance 
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in the representation of the former client.   And, perhaps most importantly, 
it may require labor-intensive, complex work that will draw scarce 
resources away from current clients because most defense attorneys are 
already under-resourced and staggering under excessive caseloads.   
In an ideal world, every defense attorney would embrace the work of 
freeing a wrongfully convicted former client, but in the real world, is it 
practicable to demand that they do so and fair to suggest that they are 
unethical if they do not? 
This Article—the first scholarship to discuss the Innocence Standard—
examines how the innocence movement’s influential emphasis on accuracy 
may be eroding other important values and aims served by the adversarial 
process.  The Innocence Standard asks defense counsel to serve two 
masters, her client and the truth.  The creation of this dual obligation 
conflicts with centuries of defense tradition and decades of well-established 
doctrine.  The truth-seeking function has traditionally rested with 
prosecutors, judges, and juries; defense counsel’s primary obligation has 
always been to zealously represent her present-day client.  Shifting the 
truth-seeking burden onto defense counsel after her representation of a 
client has ended threatens to erode the adversarial system, the historical 
loyalties of defense counsel, and the meaning of zealous advocacy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact of the Innocence Movement on the criminal justice system 
has been profound, bringing into sharp relief gross injustices that previously 
had been all too easy to downplay or ignore.1 Twice a week on average, an 
innocent person is set free, often after spending decades in prison.2 These 
exonerations are extensively covered by the media, searing into the national 
consciousness powerful images of the prisoner’s emotional reaction at the 
moment of freedom and an equally powerful narrative of the long road from 
hopeless, unmitigated suffering to sudden and complete redemption.3 
The Innocence Movement—the law school clinics, non-profit 
organizations, religious institutions, and individual lawyers dedicated to the 
work of overturning wrongful convictions—has challenged the 
conventional wisdom underlying the basic tenets of our criminal justice 
 
1 See Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. 
REV. 955, 977–78 (2013/2014) (“The increased ability to amplify its message to key 
political decision-makers and instrumental organizations such as the American Bar 
Association and state forensic science commissions [is an] indicator[] the innocence projects 
and the Innocence Network are becoming more able to effect real change.”); NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., EXONERATIONS IN 2014 1 (2015), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.p
df [hereinafter NAT’L REGISTRY, 2014 EXONERATIONS] (stating that there were 125 
exonerations in the United States in 2014 and 1,535 exonerations in the United States from 
1989 to January 20, 2015).  
2 The Registry, “a project of the University of Michigan Law School, provides detailed 
information about every known exoneration in the United States since 1989[.]” NAT’L 
REGISTRY, 2014 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 12. The authors of the 2014 Report 
“recorded 125 exonerations in 2014,” which averages about 2.4 each week. See id. at 1. 
3 See, e.g., John Caniglia, Ricky Jackson and Wiley Bridgeman: Exonerated Friends 
Leave Prison After 39 Years Behind Bars, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.
cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2014/11/finally_exonerated_friends_lea.html; Nicole 
Carr, 70-Year-Old Joseph Sledge Freed After Decades in Prison, ABC11 (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://abc11.com/news/70-year-old-joseph-sledge-freed-after-decades-in-prison/488063/; 
Elahe Izadi, Ohio Man Exonerated After Spending 27 Years in Prison for a Murder He 
Didn’t Commit, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/12/09/ohio-man-exonerated-after-spending-27-years-in-prison-for-a-murder
-he-didnt-commit/; Michael McLaughlin, Alstory Simon Talks About Life After Wrongful 
Conviction, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/11/17/alstory-simon_n_6155658.html; Ashley Powers, Witness’ Sister Helps Free Man 
Convicted in 1979 Killing, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/nov/07/local/la-me-innocence-hearing-20131108. 
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system.4 Exoneration after exoneration reveals bleak truths: that 
eyewitnesses who were one-hundred percent certain are often one-hundred 
percent wrong,5 that defendants who confess may be innocent,6 that police 
 
4 See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning From 
Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9 (2009) (“[T]here are now almost fifty non-profit 
innocence projects [connected to the Innocence Movement] whose purpose is to investigate 
and litigate post-conviction claims of innocence as well as to propose reforms.”); Daniel S. 
Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1549 (2008) (“American criminal law is 
undergoing a transformation due to the increasing centrality of issues related to actual 
innocence in courtrooms, classrooms, and newsrooms.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Sentencing 
Lessons From the Innocence Movement, 21 CRIM. JUST. 6, 6–9, 13, 15 (2006) (discussing the 
myriad of ways in which the Innocence Movement has impacted the criminal justice 
system).  
 Centurion Ministries—founded by Jim McCloskey, then a theology student at Princeton, 
because of his “personal spiritual calling”—has been advocating for the wrongfully 
convicted since 1980. 1980–1989: How and Why It Was Created, CENTURION MINISTRIES, 
http://centurionministries.org/about-us/at-a-glance/. Its name comes from the words uttered 
by a Roman Centurion stationed at the Cross, who looked up at the body of Jesus Christ and 
said, “Surely this one is innocent.” Frequently Asked Questions, CENTURION MINISTRIES, 
http://centurionministries.org/faq/. For other examples of religious organization involvement 
in the Innocence Movement, see Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of 
Racial Injustice in the Criminal Law System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 871 
(2003). 
5 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE FIRST 1600 
EXONERATIONS 11 (2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600
_Exonerations.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS] (noting that thirty-
four percent of wrongful convictions from 1989 to May 18, 2015 involved mistaken 
eyewitness identification; however, in exonerations regarding rape convictions, mistaken 
eyewitness identification played a role seventy-two percent of the time); see also Seth F. 
Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and 
Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 563 (2002). 
6 NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that thirteen percent 
of all wrongful convictions from 1989 to May 18, 2015 involved false confessions). The 
Central Park Five documentary, released in 2012, explores in-depth perhaps the most famous 
false confession case in recent memory. CENTRAL PARK FIVE (PBS Distribution 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/centralparkfive. Following the rape of the woman who became 
nationally known as “the Central Park jogger,” the New York City Police Department 
arrested five teenagers—four black and one Hispanic—and interrogated them for hours 
without access to counsel and, in some cases, their parents. Cookie Ridolfi & Marjorie K. 
Allard, Book Review, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2003) (reviewing GISLI H. 
GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 
(2003)). The five young men confessed and were later tried, convicted, and imprisoned for 
the brutal attack on the victim. Id. Years later, when DNA recovered from the jogger’s 
clothing matched a known rapist who confessed to the crimes, the four men, now in their 
thirties, were freed. Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to 
Settle Suit for $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
06/20/nyregion/5-exonerated-in-central-park-jogger-case-are-to-settle-suit-for-40-million.
html?_r=0.  
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and prosecutors sometimes fail to play by the rules,7 that defense attorneys 
sometimes fall down on the job,8 and that, as a result, jurors reach the 
wrong conclusions. Between 1989 and 2015, more than 1,600 men and 
women were exonerated following years—often decades—of imprisonment 
for wrongful convictions.9 And those are just the documented cases. In all 
likelihood, there are many more.10 
It is not possible to absorb these facts without second-guessing the 
accuracy and fairness of the justice meted out in courtrooms across the 
United States. Gross miscarriages of justice occur, and they occur with 
some frequency.11 Because of the Innocence Movement, the frequency of 
wrongful convictions is now public knowledge,12 and important reforms 
 
7 NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that forty-five 
percent of exonerations from 1989 to May 18, 2015 involved official misconduct). This 
number includes the case of Michael Morton, an innocent man who spent twenty-five years 
in prison for the murder of his wife due in large part to gross misconduct by prosecutor Ken 
Anderson. See Pamela Colloff, The Guilty Man, TEX. MONTHLY (June 2013), 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/the-guilty-man/. Anderson, who went on to 
become a judge, was eventually indicted and convicted for his misconduct in the Morton 
case, and disbarred. Heather Saul, Texas Prosecutor Ken Anderson Jailed for Convicting 
Innocent Michael Morton, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/texas-prosecutor-ken-anderson-jailed-for-convicting-innocent-michael
-morton-8930428.html; Press Release, Innocence Project, Former Williamson County 
Prosecutor Ken Anderson Enters Plea to Contempt for Misconduct in Michael Mortonâ€™s 
[sic] Wrongful Murder Conviction (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.innocenceproject.org/former-
williamson-county-prosecutor-ken-anderson-enters-plea-to-contempt-for-misconduct-in-
michael-mortonaes-wrongful-murder-conviction/. 
8 Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need 
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 859–60 (2004); see also Inadequate Defense, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/in
adequate-defense (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).  
9 NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 4. 
10 There is no way to know with any certainty how many wrongfully convicted men and 
women remain in prison today, but most scholars who study the issue believe that the known 
exonerees are only “the tip of the iceberg,” freed through a combination of luck, persistence, 
good lawyering, and often DNA or forensic evidence. See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal 
Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
125, 131 (2004). 
11 Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
837, 841–42 (2011/2012). According to the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Statistics on wrongful 
convictions, which assumes an error rate of one percent, there were 72,000 wrongfully 
convicted people in the United States as of 2009. Id. at 843.  
12 See Medwed, supra note 4, at 1549–52; Benjamin C. Eggert & Ashley Eiler, Trigger 
of Insurance Coverage For Wrongful Arrest, Prosecution and Conviction Lawsuits, 22 
COVERAGE 50 (2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/
janfeb2012-trigger-of-insurance.html (“By some estimates, the rate of exonerations has been 
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designed to make the number vanishingly rare have been enacted.13 Many 
are heralded and relatively non-controversial, such as the passage of laws 
designed to ease the burden on inmates seeking DNA testing,14 the decision 
by some police departments to reform the way that line-ups and photo 
spread identifications are conducted to ensure greater accuracy,15 and the 
establishment of post-conviction integrity units within prosecutors’ offices 
 
rapidly increasing[.]”); Alan Berlow, What Happened in Norfolk?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 
19, 2007, at 36 (“[P]roclamations of innocence are no longer surprising.”); Douglas A. 
Blackmon, Louisiana Death-row Inmate Damon Thibodeaux Exonerated with DNA 
Evidence, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
louisiana-death-row-inmate-damon-thibodeaux-is-exonerated-with-dna-evidence/2012/09/
28/26e30012-0997-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html; Peter Dujardin, A Closer Look at 
Lineups, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 6, 2010), http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-02-06/news/10020
50086_1_wrongful-convictions-innocence-project-arthur-lee-whitfield (discussing need to 
“revamp” lineups due to the increased numbers of exonerations involving eyewitness 
misidentification). 
13 Fourteen states have adopted eyewitness identification reforms urged by the Innocence 
Project and the National Institute of Justice. See Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentification 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015); see also discussion of conviction integrity units, infra note 16. 
14 The First 250 DNA Exonerations: Transforming the Criminal Justice System, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/the-first-250-dna-exonerations-
transforming-the-criminal-justice-system/ (last visited June 24, 2016) (“47 states currently 
provide statutory access to post-conviction DNA testing (Alaska, Massachusetts & 
Oklahoma do not).”). In 1992, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld founded the Innocence 
Project at the Cardozo School of Law. Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited June 24, 2016). The Innocence Project is dedicated 
to helping convicted prisoners prove their innocence through DNA testing. Id. Scheck and 
Neufeld’s Innocence Project, which inspired the creation of numerous other Innocence 
Projects in other states, maintains a website that provides details about the causes of 
wrongful convictions, the personal stories of exonerees, and the legislation pending or 
enacted to bring reform to the criminal justice system. See id. According to the Innocence 
Project’s website, more than 340 people in the United States have been exonerated by DNA 
testing, “including 20 who served time on death row.” Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited June 24, 2016).  
15 See Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 13. Fourteen states have adopted 
eyewitness identification reforms urged by the Innocence Project and the National Institute 
of Justice, including: the blind administration of a photo or live line-up so that the officer in 
charge does not know the identity of the suspect; filler photographs that more closely 
resemble the suspect; specific instructions to the witness that the perpetrator may not be in 
the line-up or photo array and the investigation will go forward regardless of whether the 
witness picks someone; asking the witness to provide a written statement of his or her level 
of confidence in the identification; recording all of the identification procedures; and 
sequential presentation of the members of a line-up or the photographs in a photo array so 
that the witness views them one by one and has no opportunity to make a relative 
comparison (i.e., that person looks the most like the suspect out of all the options). Id. 
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to reexamine old cases in which there is some doubt about a defendant’s 
guilt.16 
There is a new reform, also propelled by the Innocence Movement, 
about which little is known, and which may have complex, real-world 
repercussions that have yet to be fully explored: the addition of an 
“Innocence Standard” to the American Bar Association’s code of ethics for 
criminal defense attorneys.17 
The code, known as the Defense Function Standards, exhorts defense 
attorneys to abide by the highest ethical standards in the defense of their 
clients.18 While the American Bar Association’s Defense Function 
 
16 NAT’L REGISTRY, 2014 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 1. There has been a rise in 
Conviction Integrity Units (CIUs), with 15 CIUs in 2014 compared to 9 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 
and 5 in 2011. See id. at 6. CIUs are “long-term operations” run by prosecutors “that work to 
prevent, to identify and to remedy false convictions.” Id.; see also Barry Scheck, 
Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, 
and Models For Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2217–18 (2010); Keith Swisher, 
Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest In Post-Conviction Practice, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 181, 
212 n.113 (2012); Zalman & Carrano, supra note 1, at 975. 
17 AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE 
GUILTY, REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE 
TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna S. Raeder 
eds., 2006), reprinted in 37 SW. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (2008) (explaining that the rising tide of 
exonerations prompted the ABA to form an Ad Hoc Innocence Committee in 2002 to 
propose reforms to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system) [hereinafter 
ACHIEVING JUSTICE]. This committee passed nine resolutions, id. at 774, and much of the 
committee’s work is reflected in the revised Prosecution and Defense Function Standards. 
The Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions, first published in 1979, are built on 
the ethical obligations specific to criminal lawyers in the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4–1.1(b) (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter DEFENSE STANDARDS], http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition-Tableof
Contents.html (“For purposes of consistency, these Standards sometimes include language 
taken from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; but the Standards often address 
conduct or provide details beyond that governed by the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”); AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
§ 3–1.1(b) (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter PROSECUTION STANDARDS], http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/criminaljustice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition-TableofContents.
html. The Fourth Edition of the Standard was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 
February 2015. See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra, Table of Contents; PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra, Table of Contents. For a discussion of how the standards were revised, 
see Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1112–18 (2011) (describing the 
“challenging and professionally absorbing” process of editing the Criminal Justice Standards 
for Prosecution and Defense Functions, which have not been revised since 1991).  
18 See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.1 (noting that while the Standards are 
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Standards lack the force of law, their influence on ethical norms, 
jurisprudence, and legislation is readily apparent: they have been adopted 
by the vast majority of states and cited hundreds of times by the United 
States Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts.19 
The new Innocence Standard, formally adopted in February of 2015, 
imposes an affirmative obligation on defense counsel “to act” upon learning 
of evidence that creates a “reasonable likelihood” that a former client may 
have been “wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent.”20 
 
“aspirational,” and descriptive of “best practices,” rather than having the force of law, 
“[t]hey may be relevant in judicial evaluation of constitutional claims regarding the right to 
counsel,” and are “intended to address the performance of criminal defense counsel in all 
stages of their professional work”). 
19 Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of 
Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11–12 (2009). By May 1979, five years after the Standards 
were first fully published in 1974, thirty-six states had revised their criminal codes to 
incorporate all or part of them. Id. In two landmark cases, the United States Supreme Court 
singled out the Criminal Defense Standards as a helpful reference point in developing and 
interpreting the law relating to assessing a trial attorney’s fulfillment of the Sixth 
Amendment obligation to provide the effective assistance of counsel. See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010) (“Although they are ‘only guides,’ . . . and not 
‘inexorable commands,’ . . . these [ABA Criminal Justice] standards may be valuable 
measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation.”); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting that the Standards set forth “[p]revailing 
norms of practice” that act as “guides to determining what is reasonable”). As Professor 
Bruce Green has pointed out: 
[E]ven if enforceable law does not dictate how prosecutors should exercise charging discretion 
in a particular situation or whether defense lawyers should advise clients about confidentiality 
obligations and associated exceptions, there is a value to developing and articulating standards 
governing this conduct if a professional consensus can be achieved. In that event, lawyers might 
be subject to public or professional opprobrium for departing from the professional standards.  
Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093, 1097 (2011).  
20 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. There is spirited debate about what 
“innocence” means as a legal concept. Some people distinguish between legal (or “actual”) 
and factual innocence with the idea that those falling into the former category are exonerated 
based on constitutional or other rights violations while those falling into the latter category 
are factually innocent in that they did not commit the charged crime. See Cathleen Burnett, 
Constructions of Innocence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 971, 975–80 (2002); cf. William S. Laufer, 
The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 n.4 (1995) (arguing that legal, actual, 
and factual innocence are “three conceptually distinct determinations of innocence”); 
Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456 (2001) 
(discussing “burden of proof,” factual, and legal innocence). These distinctions, however, 
obscure the fact that most exonerees, factually innocent or otherwise, are freed because of 
legal errors, as innocence is rarely recognized as a freestanding claim. See Lara Bazelon, 
Scalia’s Embarrassing Question, SLATE (Mar. 11, 2015, 9:37 a.m.), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/03/innocence_is_not_cause_for_ex
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In so doing, it offers a vision of what it means to be a criminal defense 
lawyer that is a stark departure from traditional practice. In this new 
paradigm, defense counsel is an advocate with an ethical obligation to the 
truth, whose ongoing responsibilities to uncover and present that truth have 
no clear boundaries or end point.21 While the Innocence Standard has the 
laudable aim of exposing and correcting wrongful convictions, it also has 
the potential to create an ethical thicket for counsel, destabilizing the 
relationship between counsel and her current clients while imposing a 
heavy burden on an already understaffed and overworked defense bar. 
The Innocence Standard mirrors the ethical obligations already 
imposed on prosecutors,22 establishing parity between the two sides in this 
realm. Yet, prosecutors and defense attorneys play fundamentally different 
roles in our adversarial system. Prosecutors are ministers of justice who 
serve the truth at all costs, even if it means undermining an ongoing 
prosecution or seeking to vacate an old conviction. Defense counsel, on the 
other hand, must do everything possible within the bounds of the law to 
zealously represent their current clients, with no obligation to the truth or 
any duty to act affirmatively on behalf of someone they no longer represent. 
By expanding defense counsel’s obligations to bring them more in line with 
those of prosecutors, the Innocence Standard may have blurred a line that 
should be drawn plainly in the sand. 
Part I of this Article sets forth the parameters of the criminal defense 
attorney–client relationship as it has been traditionally defined, and 
discusses the ways the new Innocence Standard alters that definition. Part II 
discusses the historical and moral justifications for enacting this change: the 
emergence of the Innocence Movement, the steady flow of exonerations 
 
oneration_scalia_s_embarrassing_question_is.html. In other words, the categorization is 
misleading in that it implies there is no overlap when the overlap is practically speaking, 
almost complete. As Keith Findley, the former director of the Wisconsin Innocence Project, 
has argued: “[T]hese distinctions are largely meaningless in our system of justice . . . there is 
really only one functional category of ‘innocence,’ although how innocence is determined 
can vary depending on context.” Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 
1157, 1160 (2010/2011). Newly proposed Standard 4–9.4 adheres to Professor Findley’s 
standard by requiring “some duty to act,” for ethical purposes, whenever counsel discovers 
factual or legal evidence pointing to a “reasonable likelihood that a . . . former client was 
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or [] actually innocent[.]” DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra 
note 17, § 4–9.4.  
21 See Raymond, supra note 20, at 450–51 (2001) (“[W]e need to consider the 
consequences of the innocence movement for the ones left behind: the lawyers, defendants, 
and jurors trying to secure just outcomes in criminal cases.”).  
22 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULES] R. 3.8(g)–(h) 
(1983).  
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that point unambiguously to the gross failure of the system to fulfill its 
“truth-seeking” function, and a recognition, among many prominent 
practitioners of criminal defense, that a holistic model of representation is 
crucial to effective representation. 
Part III argues that the Innocence Standard, while undeniably well-
intentioned, unfortunately fails to address the ethical implications of its 
“duty to act” imperative. Left unaddressed are three major potential 
conflicts for counsel. First, how to “act” if the newly discovered 
information pointing to a former client’s innocence may cause harm to a 
current client, second, how to “act” if the newly discovered evidence went 
undiscovered due to counsel’s own failings during the representation of the 
former client, and third, how to “act” in the ways the Standard demands 
while carrying an excessive caseload that makes the competent 
representation of current clients nearly impossible. 
Part IV proposes revisions to the Innocence Standard that address the 
ethical and practical dilemmas it implicitly raises while acknowledging that 
these suggestions do not provide a conclusive resolution to the question it 
poses: can defense counsel serve two masters, her current client and the 
truth? In this Article, I argue that the answer to that question is no. The 
Standard must be rewritten to make clear that a “duty to act” on behalf of a 
former, possibly innocent client is ethical and practicable only when it is 
consistent with defense counsel’s centuries-long established role in the 
criminal justice system. The truth-seeking function rests with the prosecutor 
and the court. Placing the same burden upon defense counsel without 
limitations or precise definitions creates a false equivalency and endorses a 
model of practice that could threaten to erode the adversarial system, 
which, however imperfect, is what we rely upon to see that justice is done. 
I. THE NEW INNOCENCE STANDARD AND ITS RECONCEPTION OF THE 
ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
This section sets forth the parameters of the attorney–client 
relationship in the American criminal justice system as it has been 
understood for centuries, then explains the ways in which the ABA’s new 
Innocence Standard would fundamentally alter those parameters. 
A. ESTABLISHED LEGAL AND ETHICAL PARAMETERS GOVERNING 
THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN CRIMINAL CASES 
The parameters of the attorney–client relationship in criminal cases are 
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set forth in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, which guarantee the accused the rights to due process, 
counsel, and equal protection of the laws respectively.23 The Supreme Court 
has interpreted these rights to mean that any person accused of a felony or a 
misdemeanor that can result in jail time, a suspended sentence, or probation 
is entitled to have the effective assistance of counsel24 at all “critical 
stage[s] of the [criminal] prosecution” after the filing of formal charges.25 
The guarantee of competent legal representation at trial continues 
through the disposition of the criminal case, whether by trial or plea.26 
Counsel is also guaranteed on direct appeal if the defendant is convicted.27 
Many defendants, rich and poor, have different attorneys at the trial and 
appellate stages, creating two separate, clearly demarcated attorney–client 
 
23 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV.  
24 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984). The Court has held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to “effective” counsel, defined as a lawyer 
whose performance falls within “an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by 
“prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. Reviewing courts must approach every case with 
the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was effective. Id. at 689. To prove 
otherwise, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance; that is, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there was a reasonable probability of a different result. Id. at 700. 
25 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion) (quoting Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1967)); see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 
(1970) (plurality opinion) (holding that a criminal defendant has the right to counsel at 
preliminary hearings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (holding that a 
criminal defendant has the right to counsel at a pretrial line-up); Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that a criminal defendant has the right to counsel at post-
indictment interrogations); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961) (holding that a 
criminal has the right to counsel at arraignment). 
26 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (noting precedent recognizes a right to 
counsel during plea-bargaining process); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012) 
(holding same); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that a state must, at 
trial, provide counsel to indigent defendants facing a term of imprisonment); Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (same); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) 
(“[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 58 (1932). 
27 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). The right to counsel on appeal is 
a Fifth Amendment right, not a Sixth Amendment right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 
396 (1985) (“A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due process 
of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.”). For a thorough 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence from Powell v. Alabama 
through Strickland v. Washington, see, generally, Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and 
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 13–28 
(1986).  
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relationships.28 In non-capital cases, the conclusion of the direct appeal 
marks the end of the attorney–appellate client relationship for constitutional 
purposes.29 Of course, wealthy defendants in all likelihood will retain 
counsel for further appeals and habeas proceedings. And, a small fraction of 
indigent, non-capital defendants are fortunate enough to obtain a court-
appointed attorney on habeas because the reviewing judge believes that 
counsel is necessary.30 
Except for the select group of criminal defendants who can afford 
habeas counsel or are entitled to it because they were sentenced to death, 
the attorney–client relationship ends with the termination of the criminal 
case at the trial or appellate level.31 The defendant’s file is closed and sent 
to storage, and defense counsel files no further pleadings, makes no further 
court appearances, and collects no further fees—either from the client or the 
court. Traditionally and for all practical purposes, the formal, advocacy-
driven relationship is over. Once counsel ceases to act as the defendant’s 
legal representative in that defendant’s criminal case, she becomes “former 
counsel,” whose client is now a “former client.” 
The end of the attorney–client relationship has always been less 
circumscribed when viewed from an ethical, rather than a constitutional or 
 
28 See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356. 
29 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 12.2 (6th ed. 2011) (“[A]ppointed counsel is mandatory for all indigent 
capital prisoners and becomes available even before they file federal habeas corpus petitions 
when, as normally is the case, they need appointed counsel to assist them in investigating 
and presenting claims in their petitions. In other cases, however, indigent (i.e., nearly all) 
federal habeas corpus petitioners commence the proceedings either without legal assistance 
or with only the aid of a fellow inmate or a volunteer attorney who may be unable to proceed 
with the case in the absence of reimbursement for costs and time spent on the case.” 
(footnotes omitted)); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855–56 (1994).  
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(h) (2012) (“[I]n all [habeas] proceedings brought under this 
section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel for an 
applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel, except as provided by a 
rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.”); see also id. R. 
8(c). (“If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent 
a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A [adequate 
representation of defendants]. The judge must conduct the hearing as soon as practicable 
after giving the attorneys adequate time to investigate and prepare.”). 
31 See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 4–8.1, 4–9.1, 4–9.2, 4–9.5. For trial 
counsel, the case terminates after the client has been sentenced, any necessary post-trial 
motions have been filed and litigated, and counsel has filed a notice of appeal. See id. §§ 4–
8.1(b), 4–9.1(b), (c). For appellate counsel, representation generally continues “through all 
stages of a direct appeal, including review in the United States Supreme Court.” Id. § 4–
9.2(h); see also id. § 4–9.5(a). 
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action-driven, perspective. The duties of loyalty and confidentiality, for 
example, have long been understood to outlast not simply the life of the 
case, but the life of the client and the attorney.32 But other than the rote 
obligations to file a notice of appeal and return the client’s files and 
property, counsel’s post-case duties are passive, fulfilled by simply saying 
and doing nothing.33 
B. THE NEW INNOCENCE STANDARD 
The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted the 
Innocence Standard, which is formally known as Defense Function 
Standard 4-9.4, in February of 2015.34 The new standard tasks defense 
counsel with an ethical obligation without precedent or constitutional 
mooring: to affirmatively act to safeguard the rights of a former client in 
any criminal case—even if that case had been closed for years, if not 
decades earlier.35 
The full text of the ABA’s Innocence Standard states: 
(a) When defense counsel becomes aware of credible and material evidence or law 
creating a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was wrongfully 
convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent, counsel has some duty to act. This 
duty applies even after counsel’s representation is ended. Counsel must consider, and 
act in accordance with, duties of confidentiality. If such a former client currently has 
counsel, former counsel may discharge the duty by alerting the client’s current 
counsel. 
(b) If such newly discovered evidence or law (whether due to a change in the law or 
not) relevant to the validity of the client’s conviction or sentence, or evidence or law 
tending to show actual innocence of the client, comes to the attention of the client’s 
current defense counsel at any time after conviction, counsel should promptly: 
 (i) evaluate the information, investigate if necessary, and determine what potential 
remedies are available; 
 (ii) advise and consult with the client; and 
 (iii) determine what action if any to take. 
(c) Counsel should determine applicable deadlines for the effective use of such 
evidence or law, including federal habeas corpus deadlines, and timely act to preserve 
 
32 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998). 
33 See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.9 cmt. 1 (clarifying that the duty of 
confidentiality outlasts the representation); id. at R. 1.9(c)(2) (explaining the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest between current and former clients by not revealing information relating 
to a former client’s representation “except as these Rules would permit or require”). 
34 See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, Table of Contents. 
35 Id. § 4–9.4(a).  
2. BAZELON 3.12.17                                                                                                                              3/12/2017 4:53 PM 
694 AFTER THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT [Vol. 106 
the client’s rights. Counsel should determine whether—and if so, how best—to notify 
the prosecution and court of such evidence.36 
C. IMPACT OF THE INNOCENCE STANDARD 
The Innocence Standard states that defense counsel has “some duty to 
act” upon learning “of credible and material evidence or law [which] 
create[s] a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was 
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent . . . . This duty 
applies even after counsel’s representation is ended.”37 The final paragraph 
instructs counsel or former counsel to learn of any statutes of limitations 
that might limit the use of the evidence in a post-conviction proceeding and 
to act to ensure that the deadline does not run before the evidence is brought 
forward. The Standard also instructs present and former counsel to consider 
the pros and cons of informing the court and the prosecution.38 The rule is 
written broadly to apply to any kind of criminal case: felony or 
misdemeanor, capital or noncapital. 
The Innocence Standard’s imperative that a defense attorney “act” on 
behalf of a former client in these complex and potentially labor-intensive 
ways is unprecedented. Nowhere else in the American Bar Association’s 
Defense Function Standards or the American Bar Association’s Model 
Code of Professional Conduct is counsel required to do anything on behalf 
of a former client, other than the rote tasks of filing a notice of appeal, 
returning the client’s property, and providing the case file to the client and 
 
36 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. As it applies to a current client, the 
obligations imposed by the new Standard are utterly consistent with defense counsel’s pre-
existing duty of zealous representation. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
Indeed, one could argue that there is no need to spell out explicitly what is implicit, that a 
competent attorney, upon learning of a current client’s possible innocence, would investigate 
the evidence, advise the client, and determine from there what appropriate actions to take. 
See id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5. And, at first read, the Innocence Standard’s “duty to act” as applied to 
a former client also seems eminently reasonable, even obvious: why would trial counsel not 
do everything in her power to advocate on behalf of a former client if she learns of new 
evidence pointing to that client’s innocence or wrongful conviction? See DEFENSE 
STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. The Innocence Movement has proven that wrongful 
convictions are a serious problem; making defense counsel part of the solution is one more 
means of solving it. The ABA can also rightly point to precedent for the new Innocence 
Standard it has applied to prosecutors since 2008. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 
3.8(g)–(h). 
37 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a) (emphasis added).  
38 See id. § 4–9.4(c) (“Counsel should determine whether—and if so, how best—to 
notify the prosecution and court of such evidence.”).  
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successor counsel, if requested.39 Counsel fulfills her unending duty of 
confidentiality with the ultimate non-action: remaining silent. 
But the Innocence Standard demands more than passivity if new 
evidence emerges indicating the wrongful conviction of a former client. 
While the Standard says the duty to act can be discharged by informing the 
former client’s current counsel, that exit ramp will rarely be available 
because the vast majority of post-appeal convicted inmates have no 
counsel.40 And although the Standard does not elaborate on what “some 
duty to act” might involve, if the imperative is exoneration, it logically 
follows that it would include the same actions the Standard mandates for 
current counsel: “evaluate,” “investigate,” and “advise and consult with the 
[former] client.”41 
More specifically, the Innocence Standard obligates both current and 
former counsel to “determine applicable deadlines for the effective use of 
such evidence or law, including federal habeas corpus deadlines, and [to] 
timely act to preserve the client’s rights.”42 This undertaking is complex 
and fraught. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), which governs the litigation of federal habeas petitions, imposes 
a stringent statute of limitations on prisoners seeking to challenge their 
convictions through the vehicle of federal habeas.43  
 
39 Id. §§ 4–3.11(c), 4–9.1(c). The ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which apply to 
civil and criminal lawyers alike and which have been adopted by the majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States, also make no mention of any affirmative duty to act by 
defense counsel on behalf of a former client, other than the duty to return the client’s papers 
and property. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.16(d); see Jenna C. Newmark, Note, The 
Lawyer’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: Duty and Self-Defense in Postconviction Ineffectiveness 
Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 708–20 (2010) (delineating a lawyer’s ethical obligation 
to former clients as the duty of confidentiality and the duty to provide information). The 
same holds true for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers. See id.  
40 See Wayne E. Brucar, Post-Conviction Petition Practice: How to Write a Successful 
Petition and Get Your Client a Hearing, 26 DCBA BRIEF 22, 23 (2014) (“There is no 
constitutional right to counsel in Post-Conviction proceedings.”), http://www.dcba.org/
resource/resmgr/Brief_pdf/BRIEF_Mar2014.pdf; Edward A. Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in 
Maryland: Past, Present, and Future, 45 MD. L. REV. 927, 958 (1986) (“[T]here is no federal 
or state constitutional right to counsel at a post-conviction proceeding [in noncapital 
cases].”). 
41 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(b).  
42 Id. § 4–9.4(c). 
43 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
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The habeas deadline gives rise to a number of challenges that inmates 
must confront, which include complying with tight filing deadlines and 
exhausting all federal claims in state court before seeking habeas 
protection. Satisfying these obligations requires careful strategic thinking 
and the preparation of complex written pleadings. Compounding that 
challenge is the fact that non-capital prisoners seeking habeas relief have no 
right to counsel, and thus must represent themselves in all AEDPA-related 
proceedings unless they can afford an attorney.44 The vast majority, 
however, are indigent and therefore unrepresented.45 Compliance with the 
Innocence Standard, therefore, seems to task former counsel with 
explaining AEDPA’s complexities to the former client. 
Compliance may require significant self-education for prior counsel. 
Most state court practitioners have no reason to be familiar with AEDPA, 
which demands that an inmate file a federal habeas petition no later than 
one year and ninety days from the date the highest state court denied the 
direct appeal, or one year from the date that the United States Supreme 
Court denies certiorari.46 This deadline may be relatively easy to calculate 
and apply, and for many former clients, it will have long passed by the time 
the new evidence surfaces.47 But the blown deadline does not discharge 
counsel of her responsibilities of the Standard, because it may be overcome 
by what is known as the “innocence gateway,” an exception that allows a 
defendant to present an untimely federal claim if it turns on evidence of 
 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”); see also Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The 
Challenge of Postconviction Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
545, 549 n.16 (2014) (“In practice, [AEDPA] created a mountain of significant procedural 
hurdles to inmates seeking habeas relief.”). 
44 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“[T]he right to appointed 
counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”).  
45 See Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 88–89 (2011) (“Of the 
criminally confined prisoners attacking capital sentences, almost ninety-five percent were 
represented by counsel. By contrast, only about two percent of criminally confined, 
noncapital prisoners had lawyers.”).  
46 Levenson, supra note 43.  Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Federal 
Habeas Corpus For Trial Lawyers, J. KAN. B.A., Jan. 2004, at 20, 22 (“There are four 
distinct starting points for calculating the deadline, depending on four different 
circumstances. The common starting point for most state inmates is ‘the date on which the 
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review.’ This time period includes time the case spends on direct appeal, on 
petition for review before the state supreme court, and the 90 days allowed for the filing of a 
certiorari petition even if the petition is not filed.” (footnote omitted)). 
47 Any inmate who fails to file within AEDPA’s statute of limitations is considered time-
barred, absent an exception. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). 
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actual innocence.48 To comply with the Innocence Standard, defense 
counsel seems tasked with advising former clients of the innocence gateway 
exception and explaining how most effectively to litigate pro se so that their 
untimely claims have a chance of receiving due consideration. Ideally, the 
previous counsel would also advise former clients to file a request for the 
appointment of new counsel. Because that motion is so crucial, the previous 
counsel should also consider helping former clients with the drafting of the 
motion so that it has a better chance of success. 
For the select group of former clients within AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, the duty to “timely act to preserve the client’s rights” will 
involve an even more complicated series of explanations. AEDPA demands 
that the timely filed federal petition be: (a) comprehensive—include every 
cognizable federal constitutional claim49—and, (b) exhausted—contain only 
claims that have been previously evaluated on their merits by the state 
courts.50 So-called successive claims—that is, claims in petitions brought 
after the first petition—are almost certain to be denied as untimely.51 And 
unexhausted claims are generally dismissed outright.52 
 
48 See id. The Supreme Court has never held that a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence may serve as the basis for federal habeas relief. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 
400–01 (1993) (“Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide 
for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.”). Recently, however, 
the Court held that, “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a 
petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or . . . expiration of the 
statute of limitations.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.  
49 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 11.3[b] (“[AEDPA] created a number of new 
procedural defenses and expanded others that already existed. As a result, prisoners have 
even more reason than before to discover and include in their initial federal habeas corpus 
petitions every ‘colorable ground[] for relief[.]’” (footnotes omitted)); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2244(b)(2)–(3), 2255(h) (2012) (barring any second or successive habeas petition unless it 
cites new rules of constitutional law with retroactive effect as its basis, or the factual 
predicate giving rise to the constitutional claim could not have been discovered at the time 
with due diligence); see also Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015). 
50 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) 
(holding that § 2254 requires a district court to dismiss any habeas petition with unexhausted 
state court claims); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1317 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“A 
federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner unless he has properly exhausted 
his remedies in state court.” (quoting Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 
2003) (en banc)). 
51 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 28.3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); see, e.g., 
Gage, 793 F.3d at 1165–66. 
52 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 23.1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–76 (1971); Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
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For these reasons, it is important for the former client to file every 
viable federal constitutional claim in a single petition. But at least one of 
those claims will not be exhausted: a claim that involves newly discovered 
evidence unavailable to the prisoner at an earlier date, which points to his or 
her innocence or wrongful conviction.53 If a former client has, in addition to 
the innocence claim, at least one other claim that the state courts have 
previously reviewed (and rejected), he or she will have a “mixed petition,” 
which contains some claims that are exhausted and some claims that are 
not.54 Therefore, counsel must also advise the former client to seek a stay 
from the federal district court to go back to state court and exhaust the 
unexhausted claim or claims. Competently advising the former client 
involves familiarity with the stay-and-abey doctrine, and the ability to 
explain to the client how to litigate, pro se, to obtain a stay-and-abey 
order.55 Once again, counsel should also advise the client to file a motion 
for the appointment of counsel and help the client with the drafting of the 
 
53 McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. Evidence of actual innocence is often newly 
discovered not because it is “new,” per se, but because it was withheld due to misconduct by 
the prosecution or police, false testimony by witnesses, or ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, all of which are constitutionally viable grounds for habeas relief. See Bazelon, 
supra note 20. Thus, evidence of actual innocence is often presented to federal courts 
through one of these vehicles. Id. The obvious conflict presented by former counsel advising 
a former client to present an actual innocence claim by arguing that former counsel herself 
was ineffective is explored in Part III.B, infra. 
54 See Rose, 455 U.S. at 518–19 (classifying as “mixed” any federal habeas petition that 
contained even one unexhausted state claim).  
55 The United States Supreme Court has authorized federal district courts confronted 
with mixed petitions to issue a stay to allow the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust 
his unexhausted claims if: (1) there is good cause for the failure to exhaust, (2) the claims are 
potentially meritorious, and (3) there is no evidence of abusive or dilatory tactics. Rhines v. 
Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005) (holding that when outright dismissal of petitioner’s 
unexhausted claims would bar petitioner from later bringing them in federal court, district 
courts may issue a stay-and-abeyance for a reasonable time period until petitioner can 
exhaust all claims in state court). A further wrinkle would occur for the current counsel if the 
newly discovered innocence claim is the only claim the former client intends to present to 
the federal court and thus the entire petition is unexhausted. The Supreme Court has never 
held that Rhines stays apply to a completely unexhausted petition, but three circuit courts 
have applied Rhines in that context, and competent counsel should advise a former client to 
raise this argument. See Hyman v. Keller, 10-6652, 2011 WL 3489092, at *10 (4th Cir. Aug. 
10, 2011) (applying Rhines’s stay-and-abey procedure where previous state court dismissal 
of habeas did not address unexhausted claim); Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 
2009) (finding that Rhines and other Supreme Court precedent allow for “protective” stay-
and-abey habeas petitions, “even where only unexhausted claims are at issue”); Dolis v. 
Chambers, 454 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding previous order to allow Rhines 
stay-and-abey procedure for unexhausted habeas petition). 
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motion. 
As this example demonstrates, acting to preserve a past client’s federal 
habeas rights effectively converts former counsel into current counsel, 
because fulfilling the Standard’s mandate essentially re-institutes the 
original attorney–client relationship. The Standard does not address the 
potential ethical, legal, practical, and financial difficulties prior counsel 
might confront in fulfilling these post-representation responsibilities. 
The impulse to impose additional ethical obligations upon the defense 
bar as a way of correcting wrongful convictions is understandable. There is 
no doubt that the wrongful conviction and incarceration of a criminal 
defendant is horrific and tragic for that individual and his or her loved ones. 
It is also undeniable that this kind of blatant injustice is abhorrent and 
represents the ultimate breakdown in the criminal justice system. What is 
contentious about the Standard is not its moral imperative but rather the 
heavy burden it places on defense counsel to “act” in “some” way—both 
defined and undefined—without taking into account the potential ethical, 
reputational, practical, and financial costs such actions might incur. 
II. LEGAL AND MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INNOCENCE STANDARD 
This section discusses the growing power of the Innocence Movement 
to effect reforms within the criminal justice system, summarizes the most 
prominent of those reforms, and then explores the impact of the movement 
on the creation of new ethical standards for prosecutors and defense 
attorneys. 
A. THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 
The Innocence Standard has no accompanying commentary as of the 
writing of this Article. Nevertheless, the intent behind the creation of the 
rule—to rectify miscarriages of justice—seems clear from the text and the 
American Bar Association’s attentiveness to the problem of wrongful 
convictions.56 
The American Bar Association’s focus on this problem reflects a 
building national consensus that the existence of so many exonerees is the 
result of significant defects in the criminal justice system that are in need of 
remedy.57 Over the last two decades, a sea change has taken place in the 
 
56 See, e.g., ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 773 (describing the ABA’s 2008 
decision to pass nine resolutions designed to “better ensure that individuals will not be 
convicted of crimes they did not commit, and to compensate those who are exonerated”).  
57 See generally Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful 
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attention paid by lawyers to the problem of wrongful convictions, which in 
turn has heightened public awareness of the problem and its horrific 
consequences.58 Conservative estimates put the number of people serving 
time in prison for crimes they did not commit in the tens of thousands.59 As 
the number of exonerees has risen, innocence projects and other non-profit 
organizations devoted to freeing and compensating the wrongfully 
convicted have also grown in number.60 In recent years, the Innocence 
Movement has resulted in “widespread systemic reform,” including greater 
DNA collection and testing, changes to police investigative procedures, 
rules to prevent prosecutorial misconduct, increased funding for capital 
 
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825 (2010) 
(historical overview and comprehensive analysis of a century of wrongful convictions). 
58 Kimberley A. Clow et al., Public Perception of Wrongful Conviction: Support for 
Compensation and Apologies, 75 ALB L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2011/2012) (“With over 280 
post-conviction DNA exonerations through Innocence Projects in the United States alone 
and half a dozen Commissions of Inquiry into wrongful convictions in Canada, the public 
may be more aware of wrongful convictions than ever before.”); Elizabeth S. Vartkessian & 
Jared P. Tyler, Legal and Social Exoneration: The Consequences of Michael Toney’s 
Wrongful Conviction, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2011/2012) (“In the last twenty years 
increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the causes and 
consequences of wrongful convictions.”). 
59 In 2015, the National Registry of Exonerations released a report called The First 1,600 
Exonerations, which documented the number of men and women exonerated from January 
1989 through May 18, 2015. NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 1; see 
also Medwed, supra note 10, at 131 (noting the lack of certainty surrounding the number of 
wrongfully convicted prisoners). Most wrongful conviction cases do not involve DNA or 
forensic evidence, which makes proving the wrongful conviction a great deal more difficult. 
See NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that seventy-five 
percent of exonerations do not involve DNA evidence). A recent study by the University of 
Michigan estimated that 4.1% of the death-row population is innocent. Jan Hoffman, 4.1% 
Are Said to Face Death on Convictions That Are False, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/science/convictions-of-4-1-percent-facing-death-said-
to-be-false.html?_r=0. Conservative estimates put the number of those wrongfully convicted 
of any felony at somewhere between two and eight percent. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent 
People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty. According to the United 
States Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics, the United States has a prison population 
of approximately 1,561,500 million people in 2014.  E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2014, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5387. Assuming a conviction rate error of two percent—a very 
conservative estimate—that number translates into approximately 31,200 innocent people 
behind bars. See id.  
60 Innocence Network Member Organizations, THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, (Oct. 4, 2015, 
3:16 PM), http://innocencenetwork.org/members/ (noting the existence of over fifty 
organizations in the United States listed as “Innocence Projects.”).  
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defense attorneys, and higher standards for attorneys representing these 
clients.61 
The Innocence Movement has had a profound impact on the American 
Bar Association. In 2002, the Chair of the Criminal Justice Section 
convened an Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the 
Criminal Process.62 The Ad Hoc Innocence Committee, made up of a cross-
section of criminal justice experts including prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
judges, and law professors, spent three years researching false confessions, 
eyewitness identification procedures, forensic science, informants, defense 
counsel practices, prosecution practices, and police investigative 
techniques.63 
The Ad Hoc Innocence Committee’s work resulted in a series of 
policy recommendations, styled as nine resolutions, which were adopted by 
the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates.64 The resolutions, 
aimed at reforming police and prosecutorial procedures, recommended, 
among other things: videotaping or audiotaping police interviews with 
suspects, adopting specific procedures to improve the accuracy of line-up 
and photo array identifications, requiring that crime laboratories and 
coroner’s offices be accredited and follow standardized procedures, 
refusing to prosecute a case solely on the basis of a jailhouse informant’s 
testimony, increasing compensation for appointed defense counsel to 
promote “high quality” representation, promoting greater accountability and 
training for law enforcement officers, and providing more funding and 
training for prosecutor offices.65 More broadly, the American Bar 
Association adopted a resolution on “systemic remedies,” which exhorted 
state and federal governments to “identify and attempt to eliminate the 
causes of erroneous convictions.”66 One member of the committee 
suggested that “[a] natural place for jurisdictions to begin to review local 
laws and procedures is by comparing them to newly adopted ABA 
 
61 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and 
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 608 (2005); see also Kevin Johnson, Exonerations Hit 
Record High of 125 in 2014, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2015, at 5A (noting that of the 125 
exonerations on record for 2014, police and prosecutors cooperated in obtaining 67 of them). 
62 ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 766. 
63 Id. at 773. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 773–88. 
66 Id. at 787. 
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innocence policies[.]”67 
In 2008, the American Bar Association also amended Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.8 to significantly expand upon the prosecutor’s 
responsibilities to turn over Brady material and to investigate post-
conviction cases potentially involving wrongful convictions.68 This 
amended Rule, which applies only to prosecutors, now has two subsections 
requiring that prosecutors take specific post-conviction actions upon 
learning “of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable 
likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit [the] offense.”69 
Specifically, the amended Rule directs the prosecutor to:  
[P]romptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and . . . if the 
conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, [to] promptly disclose that 
evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and [to] undertake further 
investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine 
whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not 
commit.70  
If the prosecutor’s investigation establishes by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the defendant is innocent, “the prosecutor shall seek to 
remedy the conviction.”71 
Finally, in February of 2015, the American Bar Association adopted 
the prosecutorial version of the Innocence Standard. This new Standard, 
formally known as Prosecution Function Standard 3-8.3, recommends that 
prosecutors comply with Rule 3.8(g) and (h) whenever “a prosecutor learns 
of credible and material information creating a reasonable likelihood that a 
defendant was wrongfully convicted.”72 The second part of the standard 
would require the prosecutor to “develop policies and procedures to address 
such information[] and take actions that are consistent with applicable law, 
rules, and the duty to pursue justice.”73 While the Standard is technically a 
new standard of conduct for prosecutors, the obligations it imposes have 
been in place since the amendment to Rule 3.8 in 2008.74 
Given the American Bar Association’s extensive efforts to address the 
 
67 Id. at 787–88. 
68 MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 3.8(g)–(h). 
69 Id. R. 3.8(g). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. R. 3.8(h). 
72 PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 3–8.3. 
73 Id.  
74 See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 3.8(g)–(h) (using mandatory, “shall” language to 
create an affirmative duty).   
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problem of wrongful convictions, including its revision of Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.8, it is not surprising that the organization would 
continue to propose additional innovative reforms. The newly-adopted 
Innocence Standards for prosecutor and defense attorneys, which followed 
the passage of the nine resolutions proposed by the Ad Hoc Innocence 
Committee and the amendment to Rule 3.8, are such reforms. The ever-
growing number of exonerees, and the empirical evidence of the depth and 
breadth of the defects in the criminal justice system that account for their 
existence, provide compelling reasons to embrace both of these new 
Standards. 
B. THE HOLISTIC MODEL OF REPRESENTATION 
The development of the Innocence Standard was influenced by the 
holistic model of representation, which is a philosophy of criminal defense 
that has become increasingly popular among more progressive and well-
funded public defender and non-profit criminal defense organizations in the 
United States.75 The Innocence Standard’s exhortation “to act” on behalf of 
former clients fits neatly within the framework of holistic criminal defense, 
which advocates for the “whole client” outside the confines of the pending 
criminal case, using resources and skill-sets “beyond mere courtroom 
advocacy.”76 Below, I explain that the holistic model of representation, 
while undeniably admirable and effective, is impracticable in many 
instances because it requires resources that many criminal defense attorneys 
and less-well-funded public defense organizations do not have. As well, it 
places defense counsel in a role that is outside of her traditional adversarial 
function and may in some cases be at odds with it. The concomitant 
obligations placed on defense counsel by the Innocence Standard raise the 
same concerns. 
Practitioners of the holistic model—primarily public defenders and 
law school clinics, but also some attorneys in private practice—collapse the 
distinction between “current” and “former” clients.77 These lawyers, in 
 
75 Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral 
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 
1093–94 (2004) (listing a number of organizations that use the holistic model of 
representation); Katherine E. Kinsey, Note, It Takes a Class: An Alternative Model of Public 
Defense, 93 TEX. L. REV. 219, 252 (2014) (“As awareness of the holistic model of 
representation has grown, more actors are willing to experiment with the model.”). 
76 Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, 
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 371, 387–88 (2004).  
77 See, e.g., Douglas Ammar, Georgia Justice Project Turns Lives Around Through 
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addition to providing direct litigation services, navigate the collateral 
consequences of sustaining a criminal conviction, which may include “the 
loss or denial of public housing and other benefits, ineligibility for 
employment-related licenses, a change in immigration status, damage to 
one’s reputation in the community, and a myriad of other problems that do 
not end at legal representation and disposal of the criminal case.”78 During 
the litigation of the criminal case and long after its conclusion, defense 
counsel attacks the “root causes” of the client’s predicament by helping the 
client get access to drug treatment, benefits, childcare, psychological 
counseling, and employment opportunities. 
Public defenders, clinical law professors, and other aggressive 
proponents of the holistic model also urge defense counsel to advocate for 
proactive and preventative criminal law and policy measures, most 
importantly by demanding that states provide adequate funding for indigent 
defense.79 Pre-indictment, even pre-case, defense counsel are encouraged to 
be impact litigators involved in the “legislative, policy, and planning 
decisions that precede the trial.”80 Defense counsel are encouraged to 
combat the race- and class-based portrayal of clients in the media and to 
challenge the popular perception of criminal defendants as “guilty anyway” 
and beyond redemption.81 This is done by “reach[ing] farther into clients’ 
lives and communities” to foster a richer understanding of the client’s life 
 
Aggressive Defense, Holistic Relationships, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2004 at 50 (describing his 
non-profit’s model; charting one client’s lifelong relationship with the project; and quoting 
Representative John Lewis as saying: “A relationship with the Georgia Justice Project is a 
relationship for life. You are like one big family. You are creating pockets of . . . the 
Beloved Community.”). 
78 Douglas Ammar & Tosha Downey, Transformative Criminal Defense Practice: Truth, 
Love, and Individual Rights—The Innovative Approach of the Georgia Justice Project, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49, 55 (2003). Under this conceptual framework, “the attorney–client 
relationship is only the beginning of the relationship, not the end. It does not define the 
boundary of [the] relationship.” Id. at 56. Lawyers at the Georgia Justice Project (GJP) work 
with social workers to aid their clients with post-conviction matters, and employ some of 
them in a landscaping business it owns and operates. Id. at 56–57.  
79 Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the 
Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 401, 425–27 (2001) (“[Holistic defenders become] more active in the 
democratic process by increasing their political involvement, consensus-building with other 
groups that may be unlikely allies, and trying to secure a place for the defender voice at the 
policy-making tables. They engage in direct lobbying on specific criminal justice issues and 
organize public education campaigns.” (footnotes omitted)). 
80 See Lee, supra note 76, at 390–91. 
81 See David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1973). 
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story and its impact on the current criminal case.82 
The holistic model got a tremendous and unexpected endorsement in 
2010, when the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defense 
attorney violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective legal 
representation by failing to advise his client that he could face deportation 
by pleading guilty to transporting marijuana.83 Padilla v. Kentucky was 
notable for its evisceration of the distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences.84 Equally important was its focus on the whole client. 
Defense counsel was duty-bound to consider and discuss the client’s life 
prospects beyond the criminal case, at least within the context of 
deportation.85 
The opinion was notable for its sympathetic portrayal of the defendant 
and its refusal to narrowly define the attorney–client relationship. The 
Court began its opinion with a lengthy description of the defendant, a 
Vietnam War veteran who “served . . . with honor” and lived as a lawful 
permanent resident in the United States for more than forty years.86 Batting 
down the argument that the criminal defense attorney’s role was limited to 
advising a client about criminal penalties in the guilty plea context, the 
Court noted that for many people, removal from the United States was 
potentially a far harsher penalty than incarceration.87 The fact that 
immigration law was a specialty outside of criminal defense counsel’s 
 
82 See Brooks Holland, Holistic Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role, 
30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 639, 649 (2006) (quoting Robin Steinberg & David 
Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 123, 125 (2004)). 
83 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359–60, 366, 369 (2010). The managing attorney 
of the Civil Action Practice at The Bronx Defenders and the Director of Reentry Net 
described the decision as an “earthquake” that “shocked commentators and practitioners 
alike.” McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of 
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 796, 
798 (2011). According to Margaret Love, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney under the George 
H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, “Padilla may turn out to be the most important 
right to counsel case since Gideon, and the ‘Padilla advisory’ may become as familiar a 
fixture of a criminal case as the Miranda warning.” Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The 
“Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST. Summer 2010, at 36, 37.  
84 Smyth, supra note 83, at 796, 798, 800. 
85 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366, 369. 
86 Id. at 359. 
87 Id. at 368; see also id. at 370–71 n.11  (“[We think] any decent attorney would inform 
the client of the consequences of his plea . . . [if it could result in] ‘banishment or exile[.]’” 
(quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 390–391 (1947))). 
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bailiwick was no excuse; given the high stakes of permanent exile, it was 
incumbent upon counsel to act in clear-cut cases by giving correct legal 
advice about deportation consequences, and in less clear-cut cases, to 
advise the client that deportation was, at least, a possibility.88 
Many have agreed with the characterization of the Padilla decision as 
“the most important right to counsel case since Gideon,”89 with far reaching 
implications for the criminal defense attorney–client relationship. While 
this interpretation may be correct, it bears emphasizing that Padilla 
addressed current counsel’s obligations to a current client during the life of 
the client’s criminal case. Padilla endorsed the holistic model of 
representation within the plea and trial context. But nowhere in the decision 
did the Supreme Court endorse the major tenet of the holistic model: that 
the attorney–client relationship is unending and unbounded, with counsel’s 
“imagination and desire to help [as] the only theoretical limits.”90 
There are many reasons to embrace the holistic model of 
representation, which is innovative, rigorous, and often extremely 
effective.91 And there is an undeniable attraction in its recasting of defense 
attorneys—the red-headed stepchildren of the criminal justice system who 
some dismiss “as sleazy and unethical, one step away from the clients they 
represent.”92 Under the holistic model, defense counsel is no longer the 
despised mercenary who signs on to fight for the enemy and departs at 
war’s conclusion to take up another equally repugnant cause. Rather, the 
defense attorney is a mensch93 whose mission is to deliver the client, not 
 
88 Id. at 369. 
89 Love & Chin, supra note 83; see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Criminal 
Defense After Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 479–80 (2012) (“Padilla fits 
within the important right to counsel line of cases that finds its roots in the infamous 
Scottsboro Boys case, Powell v. Alabama, and its modern doctrinal formulation in Strickland 
v. Washington[.]” (footnotes omitted)); Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 
HOW. L.J. 693, 694 (2011) (“[Padilla is] monumental for ineffective-assistance [of counsel] 
jurisprudence[.]”). 
90 Lee, supra note 76, at 388.  
91 Clarke, supra note 79, at 448–54 (describing the New York City-based Neighborhood 
Defender Service of Harlem and Bronx Defenders, as well as the Public Defenders Service 
of Washington, D.C., as practitioners of the holistic model with sterling reputations and 
excellent results); Lee, supra note 76, at 400–01, 409–14 (providing a similar description of 
the Community Law Office in Knoxville, Tennessee, and the Georgia Justice Project in 
Atlanta). 
92 Raymond, supra note 20, at 457 (footnotes omitted) (“[O]rdinary criminal defense 
lawyer[s] . . . are not viewed as heroic. Far from it.”). 
93 See In Our Words, BE A MENSCH, http://beamensch.com/what-is-a-mensch/in-our-
words/ (defining “Mensch” as “a Yiddish word meaning ‘a person of integrity and honor’”; 
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from a righteous government adversary, but from the client’s own demons, 
by providing access to a lifetime’s worth of aid: drug treatment, 
psychological counseling, job training, anger management, government 
benefits, employment, and even friendship, staying in close touch long after 
the criminal case is a distant memory.94 The same might be said for the new 
Innocence Standard, which has prior defense counsel wearing the 
proverbial white hat, riding in to the rescue at the eleventh hour—long after 
her shift is over. The Innocence Standard emphatically rejects the idea of an 
attorney–client relationship that is bounded by time or similar pedestrian 
constraints (money, resources, legal training). 
At the same time, there are reasons to be cautious of the holistic 
model, even wary—concerns that apply with equal force when considering 
the potential complications of the Innocence Standard. The efficacy of the 
holistic model of representation is premised on partnerships with social 
workers, judges, prosecutors, religious leaders, and community members—
all persons who have different roles in the system and are often opposed to 
defense counsel’s core function. One commentator noted that the 
organizations that subscribe to the holistic ethos have “turned the image of 
the knee-jerk liberal defense lawyer on its head and have, in effect, become 
crime fighters themselves.”95 But defense counsel is emphatically not a 
“crime fighter;” that job belongs to the prosecution and the police. A 
defense attorney’s legal and ethical obligation is fundamentally different, 
and often diametrically opposed.96 
 
someone who “does what is right because it is right towards family, towards strangers, at 
home and in public”).  
94 Ammar & Downey, supra note 78, at 57 (noting that GJP lawyers view themselves as 
providers of “wraparound” social services and fierce advocates for clients years after the 
criminal case has concluded). “Once released ‘from prison or jail, [the GJP] offer[s] a 
variety of social services such as individual and group counseling, GED and literacy classes, 
monthly support dinners, and employment with [its landscaping] business.’” Id. at 57 
(quoting Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law—A Redemptive Opportunity, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1583, 1593 (2000)). GJP dismisses concerns raised by criminal 
practitioners and experts “that such amorphous boundaries cause problems in the attorney–
client relationship and are beyond the scope of professionalism” as unfounded, stating, “[w]e 
have found the opposite to be true. More permeable boundaries allow our clients to trust us 
more and begin to see us as true advocates.” Id. at 56.  
95 David E. Rovella, The Best Defense . . ., NAT’L L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A1; accord 
Clarke, supra note 79, at 404–05 (stating that holistic defenders “see their role broadly” to 
include “occasionally initiating projects with police, prosecutors, and corrections officials to 
address specific problems facing communities.”). 
96 Then, too, there is the uncomfortable fact that the holistic model is at heart 
paternalistic. As one commentator wrote, this type of approach “risks condescending clients 
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Of course, the vast majority of criminal cases result in guilty pleas that 
are the result of brokered agreements between defense counsel and her 
adversaries.97 The more collegiality and goodwill that exist between the two 
sides, the more likely they will cooperate and even collaborate on a 
favorable outcome for the client.98 But at the same time, defense counsel 
must always be ready to take on prosecutors and police, and perhaps just as 
importantly, to be seen as someone who embraces that challenge.99 Defense 
counsel’s core mission, and to some degree, political capital, is based upon 
being an advocate who squares off against the vast resources of the state 
without flinching.100 To be sure, practitioners of holistic representation 
maintain their commitment to the adversarial model.101 But some critics 
question whether the holistic model leaves some lawyers unprepared to 
aggressively litigate on behalf of clients who are despised “even in the 
communities from which they come,” because the lawyers’ default mode 
has become conciliatory and cooperative rather than antagonistic.102 
The critique of the holistic model as potentially contradicting defense 
 
severely” by implying that: “Because you are poor, we are not only going to defend you, we 
are going to fix you.” Holland, supra note 82, at 646. Many clients welcome the kind of 
individualized attention and wraparound services the holistic model provides; others 
however, may chafe at what they view as intrusiveness and the presumption that the lawyer 
has the competence to determine not only their best legal interests, but their best “life 
outcomes” as well. Id. 
97 See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2012) (“More than 90 percent of criminal cases are never tried before a jury.”), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system. 
html?_r=0; Rakoff, supra note 59 (“In 2013 . . . more than 97 percent of [federal criminal 
charges] were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went to trial.”). 
98 See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 407, 416 (2008); Jack E. Fernandez & Caroline Judge Mehta, Criminal Cases: 
Representing Individual Officers and Directors, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 2006, at 39, 41. 
99 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2478 (2004) (“If a lawyer is bent on plea bargaining and does so all the time, he 
cannot credibly threaten to go to trial. Prosecutors will offer fewer concessions to these 
lawyers’ clients because they do not have to offer more.” (footnotes omitted)). 
100 See Holland, supra note 82, at 644–46. 
101  Steinberg & Feige, supra note 82, at 124 (“Trial skills and aggressive courtroom 
advocacy remain a mainstay of a [holistic model].”). 
102 See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES 
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41–42 (2007) (describing the views of some in the defense 
bar who argue that a public defender’s focus should be on the courtroom and if those 
“office[s] elevate[] social work and community-outreach practice institutionally, [they] risk[] 
professional imbalance with [their] lawyers losing focus on their core role of plea 
negotiation and trial litigation”), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
cecs/secondchances.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Holland, supra note 82, at 642, 646–48. 
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counsel’s fundamental purpose and even inhibiting counsel from carrying 
out her adversarial responsibilities in the courtroom is very similar to the 
critique of the Innocence Standard. Both the holistic model and the 
Innocence Standard have their geneses in expanding and improving upon 
counsel’s delivery of services under the Sixth Amendment. But in their 
quest to better the system, do they inadvertently subvert it? This question 
becomes more pointed in the face of a harsh reality: for the vast majority of 
lawyers who represent indigent clients, there are not enough hours in the 
day to be a holistic attorney, even if they might like to be. This critique 
applies with equal force to the Innocence Standard, which may require 
investigative steps and legal expertise that are impracticable for the vast 
majority of criminal defenders. These complications and the ethical 
implications of the Standard—including the expansion of defense counsel’s 
role from advocate to truth-seeker and attendant conflicts of interest—are 
discussed below. 
III. THE ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DILEMMAS POSED  
BY THE INNOCENCE STANDARD 
A. THE PROBLEM WITH PARITY 
This section discusses in more detail the ethical dilemmas that the 
Innocence Standard may pose. First, establishing parity in the 
responsibilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys incorrectly suggests 
that they play the same role in the system. Second, requiring defense 
counsel to act upon the discovery of exculpatory evidence in connection 
with a former client may violate her duty to a current client. Creating 
additional obligations to “act” on behalf of former clients may draw scarce 
resources away from current clients because most defense attorneys are 
already under-resourced despite facing excessive caseloads. 
The two Innocence Standards for prosecutors and defense attorneys, 
adopted simultaneously, establish an ethical parity regarding the duty to act 
when newly discovered evidence of innocence surfaces in an old case. 
While parity has surface appeal, it fails to reflect the fundamentally 
different nature of these attorneys’ respective roles. (The ABA appeared to 
implicitly recognize this in 2008, when it amended Rule 3.8 but did not 
create a related rule for defense attorneys.) The Innocence Standard for 
prosecutors simply restates a duty already imposed by the Constitution and 
underscores the prosecutor’s ethical obligations under Rule 3.8, while 
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providing some additional explication.103 By contrast, the new Innocence 
Standard for defense attorneys has no precedent in any existing ethical rule 
or legal dictate. 
There is good reason for this discrepancy: the roles of defense counsel 
and the prosecutor do not mirror each other. Unlike defense counsel, who 
represents an individual, the prosecutor represents the public writ large.104 
Defense counsel must advocate zealously on behalf of her living, breathing 
client; the prosecutor directs her zeal toward the abstract pursuit of the 
administration of justice.105 Because prosecutors are bound to represent the 
broader public and to make sure that the system is fair, they “are subject to 
constraints and responsibilities that don’t apply to other lawyers.”106 
It makes sense to subject a prosecutor to the obligations in Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 3.8 and the new prosecution Innocence Standard 
because those obligations are entirely consistent with the prosecutor’s 
 
103 See Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the state 
has a duty in the post-conviction context “to turn over exculpatory evidence relevant to [an] 
instant habeas proceeding” when such evidence is in its possession); see also Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (describing the constitutional right to access 
exculpatory evidence).  
 It should be noted that some scholars have questioned whether the law is settled on 
whether a prosecutor who receives Brady material post-conviction is constitutionally 
obligated to disclose it to the defendant. E.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in 
Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 190 (2005) (“[N]o court has 
directly applied Brady to the postconviction context.”). But see id. at 191 (“When a 
convicted defendant files a collateral attack within statutorily prescribed time limits and the 
prosecutor comes into possession of exculpatory evidence that would help the defendant 
establish an element of the collateral claim itself, disclosure may be required.”). 
104 Compare DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b), with PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 17 § 3–1.2(b).  
105 Compare DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b), with PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 3–1.2(a)–(b). 
106 United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The Supreme Court in Berger v. United States described the 
role of prosecutors more forcefully: 
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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primary obligation to “serve truth and justice first.”107 Indeed, the 
prosecutor’s obligation “to act” to exonerate a wrongfully convicted person 
is well-established.108 Defense counsel, however, has no constitutional or 
ethical obligation to seek truth and justice; in fact, such an obligation at 
times would be irreconcilable with defense counsel’s core obligations.109 Of 
course, defense counsel is an officer of the court and cannot knowingly 
present false evidence or otherwise perpetrate a fraud.110 But refraining 
from plainly dishonest acts is not the same as fulfilling a proactive and 
continuing duty to ferret out the truth on behalf of a former client. 
For defense counsel, the Innocence Standard’s mandate to “act” in 
“some” way on behalf of a former, potentially innocent client is not so 
easily reconciled with counsel’s narrowly prescribed but deeply 
consequential role in the criminal justice system. And, as explained below, 
the Standard’s action-imperative with respect to former clients may conflict 
with defense counsel’s preexisting constitutional and ethical obligations to 
current clients. The moral attraction of the Innocence Standard is 
undeniable. The hard question is whether the Standard is justified, taking 
full account of the moral, legal, and practical complications. 
B. SERVING TWO MASTERS 
The language of the Innocence Standard is deceptively simple: “When 
defense counsel becomes aware of credible and material evidence or law 
creating a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was 
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent, counsel has 
some duty to act.”111 But what is former counsel to do if the source of 
“evidence” that “creates [the] reasonable likelihood” comes from a current 
client who is unwilling to let counsel share the information? This situation 
 
107 Id. at 1323. 
108 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (stating that prosecutors 
are “bound by the ethics of [their] office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired 
or other information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction”); MODEL 
RULES, supra note 22, R. 3.8 (setting forth the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory and 
mitigating information). 
109 See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b), (e) (stating that defense 
counsel’s “primary duties” are “to serve as their clients’ counselor and advocate with 
courage and devotion; to ensure that constitutional and other legal rights of their clients are 
protected; and to render effective, high-quality legal representation with integrity” as a 
“professional representative” of the accused); see also Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of 
American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 123 n.15 (1987).  
110 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b). 
111 Id. § 4–9.4(a). 
2. BAZELON 3.12.17                                                                                                                              3/12/2017 4:53 PM 
712 AFTER THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT [Vol. 106 
could arise because the current client is the true perpetrator, is related or 
close to the true perpetrator, or is simply unwilling to be outed as a 
“snitch.” Absent very narrowly-drawn exceptions, the attorney–client 
privilege protects all private communications, however reasonable or 
unreasonable the client’s motivations for insisting on secrecy.112 When the 
duty of confidentiality conflicts with the imperative of the Standard, it 
would appear to prohibit former counsel from doing what the Standard 
commands.113 
The Innocence Standard does not address the complications facing a 
trial attorney caught between the warring demands of two clients, the 
current “confessor” client and the “former” innocent one, each with 
apparently co-equal claims on her duties of loyalty and zealous 
representation.114 To satisfy the demands of the innocent client, she must 
 
112 In the Matter of John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Mass. 1990) 
(“The privilege of insisting that the attorney keep confidential the client’s disclosures made 
to the attorney in his or her professional capacity belongs only to the client, and therefore 
can be waived only by the client, . . . or, in some instances at least, by the executor or 
administrator of the client’s estate.” (citation omitted)). In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 
the Supreme Court noted the scant number of exceptions to the attorney–client privilege and 
expressly declined the government’s invitation to create a further exception allowing an 
attorney to reveal a client’s confidences after the client had died, stating: “A ‘no harm in one 
more exception’ rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege, without 
reference to common-law principles or ‘reason and experience.’” 524 U.S. 399, 409–10 
(1998). Existing exceptions include “the crime-fraud exception [and] the exceptions for 
claims relating to attorney competence or compensation[.]” Id. at 414 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). Some jurisdictions also provide for an exception where the client tells his 
attorney of his intent to commit a future crime. See, e.g., John Doe Grand Jury 
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 72 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
113 The conflict arises within the text of the Standard, which mandates that counsel “act” 
on behalf of a current client and maintain her duty of confidentiality to a former client. See 
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a). 
114 See id. Some might argue that this conflict is a straw man, readily resolved by the 
application of other Standards and the Model Rules. But only one Standard appears directly 
on point, and it appears to conflict with the Innocence Standard rather than clarify its 
application. Standard 4–1.7(b) states that “Defense counsel should not permit their 
professional judgment or obligations regarding the representation of a client to be adversely 
affected by loyalties or obligations to other, former, or potential clients[.]” Id. § 4–1.7(b). 
That Standard does not carve out an exception for the Innocence Standard’s “duty to act” on 
behalf of a possibly innocent client “even after counsel’s representation is ended.” Id. § 4–
9.4. Nor does the Innocence Standard carve out an exception for the Conflict of Interest 
Standard, leaving open the question of which Standard defense counsel should follow when 
compliance with both is impossible. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct refer 
obliquely to the possibility of such a conflict but do not resolve it. For example, consider the 
rule governing a counsel’s duties to former clients. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.9. 
Rule 1.9 instructs a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter not to represent 
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betray the confidences of the current client and violate what is one of the 
oldest and most sacrosanct privileges.115 To serve the current client, she 
must abandon the wrongfully convicted person she represented at trial, 
perpetuating a gross miscarriage of justice and frustrating the truth-finding 
function of the court.116 There is nothing in the wording of the proposed 
Standard to guide the attorney who faces this dilemma.117 
This scenario is not as far-fetched as it may seem.118 The vast majority 
 
a subsequent client in a “substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client[.]” Id. R. 1.9(a). Rule 1.9 also states 
that  
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter . . . shall not thereafter: (1) use 
information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these 
Rules would permit or require with respect to a client . . . or (2) reveal information relating to the 
representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client. 
Id. R. 1.9(c). But it is hard to see how Rule 1.9 resolves the counsel’s conflict. The counsel 
is not seeking to use information to the “disadvantage” of the former client but rather to that 
client’s advantage. The latter part of the rule forbids disclosure of information relating to the 
former representation except as permitted by the Rules, Id., and the Proposed Standard 
explicitly grants that permission. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. The problem 
is not disadvantageous disclosure to the former client, it is disclosure that advantages the 
former client to the disadvantage of the current one. Rule 1.16 states that “a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the 
representation of a client if: [] the representation will result in violation of the rules of 
professional conduct or other law.” MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.16(a)(1). The Rule 
also provides that withdrawal from the representation of a current client is permissible if 
there will be no “material adverse effect on the interests of the client” or “other good cause 
for withdrawal exists.” Id. R. 1.16(b). It is conceivable that defense counsel could seek to 
terminate her relationship with her current client to fulfill her innocence-obligations to her 
former client on the grounds that failing to do so would violate the Innocence Standard or 
under the catchall “other good cause.” But it is difficult to see how withdrawal would make 
any difference. It would not vitiate the duty of confidentiality that protects the information 
that has already been exchanged between the lawyer and the client whom she seeks leave to 
withdraw from representing.  
115 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
116 See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 413–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that refusing to provide an exception to protect the interests of an innocent defendant “may 
distort the record, mislead the factfinder, and undermine the central truth-seeking function of 
the courts”); State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ariz. 1976) (in banc) (arguing that 
the privilege should give way where it frustrates the constitutional right of the accused to 
present a defense to a criminal charge and compel the attendance of witnesses to provide 
relevant testimony) (Holohan, J., specially concurring). 
117 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a). 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969–74 (8th Cir. 1982). As 
described by Susan Voss, “Agosto involved an appeal of the disqualification of three 
attorneys who had separately represented three of the numerous codefendants in the case. 
One defense attorney had previously represented six grand jury witnesses, one codefendant 
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of criminal defendants are indigent and represented by court-appointed 
counsel, usually a lawyer from the public defender’s office.119 Public 
defender offices operate like law firms, so that a client of one defender is a 
client of the entire office.120 A lawyer in a public defender’s office, 
therefore, carries a list of former clients containing every individual that 
other public defenders in her office—past or present—have ever 
represented.121 Even in relatively small public defender offices in rural 
areas, this translates into thousands of people.122 
Additionally, many public defender offices see the same types of cases 
over and over again. For example, in jurisdictions encompassing poor urban 
neighborhoods, many of the defendants may be charged with shootings 
associated with the same rival gangs; in jurisdictions encompassing more 
rural areas, a large number of clients may be involved in the manufacture, 
 
until indicted, and another codefendant until arraigned. A second defense attorney had 
previously represented both a potential trial witness and a codefendant at a grand jury 
investigation. A third defense attorney had previously represented a codefendant for six 
years.” Susan Voss, Right to Counsel, 71 GEO. L.J. 589, 607 n.1876 (1982) (citations 
omitted). 
119 Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive Caseloads 
as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 422 (2012) (“Ninety-five 
percent of convictions are the result of plea bargains. Most defendants who plead guilty are 
represented by public defenders.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the 
American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the 
Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 319, 326 
(2011) (“In the United States, over 80% of those charged with felonies are indigent.”). 
120 MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.0(c); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 n.17 (May 13, 2006) (discussing the ethical obligations 
of lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants when excessive caseloads interfere 
with competent and diligent representation; “for purposes of the Model Rules, a public 
defender’s office . . . is considered to be the equivalent of a law firm”). 
121 See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.0(c). 
122 Dianne E. Courselle, When Clinics Are “Necessities Not Luxuries”: Special 
Challenges of Running a Criminal Appeals Clinic in a Rural State, 75 MISS. L.J. 721, 728–
29 (2006) (“One problem identified in ‘Gideon’s Broken Promise’ is a ‘lack of conflict-free 
representation’ for indigent defendants. The report cites hearing witnesses from three states 
in which individual attorneys or attorneys in the same office sometimes represent defendants 
with conflicting interests. A contract public defender from Montana, for example, explained: 
‘Lawyers in smaller, more rural counties in Montana are neither inclined nor trained to take 
cases when there are co-defendants or there is a conflict with the contract public defender. 
One contract defender advised me that the rural nature of his practice seems to encourage 
conflicts.’” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by 
Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1983) (“It is not unusual for a single public defender 
office to represent tens of thousands of defendants each year.”). 
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distribution, and use of drugs, such as methamphetamine.123 The repeat and 
interconnected nature of the offenses suggest that the chances are not 
insignificant that defense counsel will represent a client who reveals 
information that tends to exonerate a past client of her office. 
While a public defender office will declare a conflict of interest in 
cases that implicate the interest of any past or present client,124 the office 
may not know of the conflict of interest until the representation of the 
current client is underway.125 At that point, the duty of confidentiality has 
attached, silencing defense counsel at exactly the point when the Innocence 
Standard demands that she speak out.126 Declaring a conflict of interest and 
ceasing to represent the current client in order to act on behalf of the former 
client is explicitly precluded by the Conflict of Interest Standard 4-1.7, 
which provides: “[d]efense counsel should not permit their professional 
judgment or obligations regarding the representation of a client to be 
adversely affected by loyalties or obligations to other, former, or potential 
clients.”127 
 
123 See Meghan Clyne, Taking It to the Streets, PHILANTHROPY MAG., Summer 2009 
(“It’s brutal, terrifying, and on the rise. From coast to coast, gang crime ravages inner cities, 
destroys families, and causes whole neighborhoods to hunker down in fear. According to a 
federal report released earlier this year, criminal gangs now count roughly one million 
members—and are responsible for some 80 percent of crimes committed in American 
communities.”); Alan Elsner, Methamphetamine Scourge Sweeps Rural America, REUTERS, 
Jan. 29, 2005, available at www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1331718/posts?page=71 
(quoting North Dakota Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem as saying “When we look at our 
prison population, 10 years ago nobody had even heard of it. Now 60 percent of our male 
inmates are users and we’re building a brand new prison for female users[.]”); see also 
Bibas, supra note 99, at 2439 (“[Public defenders are] high-volume repeat players in the 
criminal arena.”). 
124 Jeff Brown, Disqualification of the Public Defender: Toward a New Protocol for 
Resolving Conflicts of Interest, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996) (arguing public defenders 
should not handle cases that would require them to attack these former clients through cross-
examination or other means if they possess material information acquired from their 
personal representation of former clients or from the representation by the public defender 
office). 
125 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1988) (stating that conflicts of 
interest are “notoriously hard [for defense counsel] to predict” in the pretrial stage of the 
proceedings); Brown, supra note 124, at 6 (“Usually, the conflict is clear in a joint 
representation case, but problems may arise where the issue is more nebulous, such as in 
cases where victims and witnesses are former or current clients of the same public defender 
office representing the accused.”). 
126 See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6. 
127 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.7(b). Normally, conflicts of interest for 
public defenders fall into one of four categories: (1) joint representation of co-defendants; 
(2) challenges by the client to the attorney’s effectiveness; (3) cases in which a victim or 
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The language of Conflict of Interest Standard 4-1.7 also appears to 
preclude, or at least complicate, any efforts by defense counsel to persuade 
the current client to allow defense counsel “to act” upon the newly 
discovered evidence of wrongful conviction by disclosing it. If the 
disclosure could cause the present client or the present client’s family 
member or friend to be investigated or charged with the crime for which the 
former client was convicted, the disclosure would have an obvious adverse 
impact on the current client’s interests. If disclosure would mean that the 
current client is revealed as a “snitch,” his or her life might be put in 
danger.128 Under any of these circumstances, it cannot be said that defense 
counsel would be “zealous[ly] advocat[ing]” for the current client with 
“courage and devotion,” as Standard 4-1.2(b) requires.129 
If defense counsel “becomes aware of credible and material 
evidence . . . creating a reasonable likelihood that a . . . former client was 
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent”130 because of 
information revealed in confidence by a current client, it does not appear 
that defense counsel can “act” in any way without the latter’s express 
consent.131 For all the reasons described above, the current client may, 
wisely, refuse to give consent. Preexisting conflict of interest rules will 
estop defense counsel from trying to change the current client’s mind,132 
while the long-standing constitutional and ethically imposed duty of 
confidentiality will prevent defense counsel from alerting the former client, 
the former client’s current counsel, or anyone else.133 In this situation, it 
seems that compliance with the Innocence Standard is ethically 
impracticable, if not impossible. 
C. SELF-INTEREST 
A separate problem arises if the new evidence pointing to a former 
 
witness is a former client of the public defender; and (4) cases where the victim is a current 
client. Brown, supra note 124, at 7–8. 
128 See, e.g., Liza I. Karsai, You Can’t Give My Name: Rethinking Witness Anonymity in 
Light of the United States and British Experience, 79 TENN. L. REV. 29, 38–44 (2011) 
(surveying federal cases in which witnesses were given anonymity after court determined 
their informant testimony placed their lives in danger). 
129 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b); see also MODEL RULES, supra note 
22, R. 1.7. 
130 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. 
131 MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6 cmt. 4. 
132 See id. R. 1.9. 
133 Id. R. 1.6. 
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client’s innocence also points to counsel’s incompetence. That is, what if 
the new, potentially exonerating information could and should have been 
discovered by defense counsel by the time of trial? Imagine a scenario in 
which a public defender, overwhelmed by a crushing caseload and facing 
back-to-back trials, neglects to interview an alibi witness for a client. 
Because defense counsel has not had the time or resources to undertake a 
thorough pretrial investigation of the case, counsel is unaware of the crucial 
nature of the testimony the witness would provide. The witness, perhaps 
someone with his own criminal record, is reluctant to get involved and 
makes no attempt to contact defense counsel at the time. Following the 
client’s conviction and sentencing, the alibi witness, now conscience-
stricken, comes forward with an account of the defendant’s whereabouts at 
the time of the offense and documentary proof (a cell phone video, a credit 
card receipt, a time-stamped parking ticket) establishing that the client was 
elsewhere when the crime occurred. 
The failure to interview such a crucial and exonerating witness would 
appear on its face to be deficient performance.134 Given the strength of the 
evidence—its corroboration by documentation—it also appears that defense 
counsel’s failure to present it at trial prejudiced the defendant because, had 
the jury heard the alibi evidence, there is a “reasonable probability 
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.”135 It is 
comforting to believe that any defense counsel would “act” immediately 
upon receipt of this information in all of the ways contemplated by the 
Innocence Standard. In such a clear-cut case, the author believes most 
probably would, even without the Standard to prod them. 
But the consequences of admitting ineffectiveness can be profoundly 
damaging. If a court were to determine that this deficient performance 
prejudiced the former client, defense counsel’s professional reputation 
would suffer greatly.136 Many state disciplinary authorities can impose 
 
134 See, e.g., Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1094–96 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the 
failure by defense counsel to interview witnesses who could have demonstrated the 
defendant’s factual innocence constitutes deficient performance). 
135 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that, in order to 
establish prejudice from ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must show reasonable 
probability that a proceeding would have been different absent “counsel’s unprofessional 
errors”). 
136 Many published opinions concluding that a defendant suffered from ineffective 
assistance of counsel refer to defense counsel by name. To cite just one example, Los 
Angeles-based criminal defense attorney Ted Yamamoto was found to have provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2002 decision, 
which used his name more than seventy times. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 919–21 (9th 
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sanctions on an attorney for providing ineffective assistance of counsel, 
ranging from a reprimand to a suspension of the license to practice law.137 
With these stakes in mind, some criminal defense attorneys might balk at 
complying with the Innocence Standard, downplaying the significance of 
the new evidence or questioning its legitimacy, knowing that “a finding that 
the lawyer has been ineffective can cause the lawyer damage, including 
casting a shadow on the lawyer’s reputation, undermining the lawyer’s 
future earning potential, and exposing the lawyer to possible professional 
discipline or a claim for legal malpractice.”138 
The impulse to dismiss or minimize the new evidence may not be 
entirely conscious. A wealth of behavioral economics research 
demonstrates that lawyers—like other professionals—are prone to bias 
when self-interest is at stake, “unconsciously focusing on evidence that 
supports a preordained conclusion and discounting evidence that does not 
fit.”139 If a few facts in the above-stated hypothetical were to change, 
making the newly discovered evidence less compelling, counsel’s natural 
proclivity to “search[] for arguments that will support an already-made 
judgment”140 might grow stronger, causing the likelihood that defense 
counsel will “act” to fall accordingly. What if, for example, the witness 
provided no documentation or other evidence to support the alibi? What if 
the witness is a parent, sibling, or spouse? Or what if the witness, while 
personally unattached to the client, has a significant criminal record that 
would be used by a prosecutor to impeach his credibility? 
Under these factual scenarios, many lawyers might determine that the 
evidence does not meet the Innocence Standard’s “credible and material” 
threshold, and therefore disregard it. While some might argue that 
disregarding such evidence is the right choice, because it spares defense 
counsel from chasing frivolous claims, others would conclude such 
 
Cir. 2002) (outlining Yamamoto’s deficient performance).   
137 See, e.g., In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 103–04 (Ariz. 1993) (in banc); The Florida Bar 
v. Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d 583, 584–85 (Fla. 1992); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McKinney, 668 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tenn. 1984). Counsel may also fear the former client 
filing a lawsuit seeking damages for malpractice. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking 
Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6–7 
(1995).  
138 Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 43, 75–76 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
139 Id. at 69–70. 
140 Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 818 (2001).  
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evidence is “credible and material.”141 Prosecutors, who have been bound to 
follow the Brady rule for more than fifty years, have a wealth of training 
and experience in applying the materiality standard in the context of 
investigating and disclosing information that may be exculpatory.142 By 
contrast, many defense counsel have no training or experience in applying 
the materiality standard.143 That lack of training and experience, combined 
with a bias toward self-protection, suggests that defense counsel may err on 
the side of inaction. 
As of yet, no commentary to the revised Prosecution and Defense 
Function Standards has been written. To better ensure compliance with the 
Innocence Standard, I suggest that the commentary accompanying the 
Innocence Standard should provide a detailed definition of “material and 
credible.” Perhaps most importantly, states and jurisdictions should 
consider immunizing from discipline defense attorneys who follow through 
 
141 Thomas K. Maher, Worst of Times, and Best of Times: The Eighth Amendment 
Implication of Increased Procedural Reliability on Existing Death Sentences, 1 ELON L. 
REV. 95, 104 (2009) (“Brady requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and results in 
reversal only when the evidence that is not disclosed is material, a standard about which 
judges and defense counsel often disagree.”); Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory 
Evidence:  Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective 
Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 448 (1984) (stating that the Supreme Court has given 
inadequate guidance in defining Brady, resulting in “unreliable and biased determinations” 
of what evidence must be disclosed to the defendant).  
142 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
143 This does not hold true for all defense counsel, as some are former prosecutors. See 
Bobby G. Frederick, Why It Matters if Your Defense Lawyer Used to be a Prosecutor, TRIAL 
THEORY (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.trialtheory.com/credibility/why-it-matters-if-your-
defense-lawyer-used-to-be-a-prosecutor/ (“There are many local defense attorneys who are 
former prosecutors[.]”). And, of course, defense attorneys are familiar with applying the 
materiality standard in other contexts, i.e., in motions seeking discovery or to overturn a 
conviction based on a Brady violation. See Lara Bazelon, “A Mistake Has Benn Made Here, 
and No One Wants to Correct It”, SLATE MAG. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/12/the_exoneration_of_kash_register_and_th
e_problem_of_false_eyewitness_testimony.html (detailing the post-conviction litigation of a 
Brady claim). But many defense attorneys have no experience applying the Brady Rule ex 
ante—that is, looking forward in time to try to predict whether a particular piece of evidence 
may become “material” at some later point. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady 
v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 543–48 (2007) 
(describing how a prosecutor’s open-file policy can lull defense counsel into believing there 
has been full disclosure under Brady when in fact there has only been full disclosure under 
the local rules of discovery). 
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on their ethical responsibility under the Innocence Standard so that they 
need not fear significant damage to their professional reputation or license 
to practice law. 
D. RESOURCES 
Indigent criminal defense in this country is in crisis, and has been for 
decades.144 Indigent defendants make up the vast majority of criminal 
cases,145 meaning that their legal representatives are public defenders or 
private practitioners paid by the court, usually under a contract with a strict 
fee cap.146 In many states, the cap is set so low that it precludes anything 
but the most minimal representation.147 Given lack of funding at both the 
state and federal level, many defender offices suffer from budget cuts and 
layoffs, and contract attorney fees have not risen to adjust for the cost of 
living or inflation.148 
 
144 AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT 
ON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS v (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authc
heckdam.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (“Forty years after Gideon v. 
Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States remains in a state of crisis, resulting in a 
system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of wrongful 
conviction.”). A previous report authored on the adequacy of funding for indigent defense by 
the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants in 1983 (Gideon’s 
twentieth anniversary) reached the same conclusion. See id. at 7. 
145 Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United 
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31 (1995) (“It is not uncommon for indigent defense 
programs to represent up to 90 percent of all criminal defendants in a given felony 
jurisdiction.”). 
146 See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 145, at 32–37 (describing the different 
categories of indigent defense services).  
147 Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1291–92 (2013); see GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 
144, at ii. 
148 Bibas, supra note 147. Professor Bibas detailed the crisis these attorneys are facing: 
Appointed defense counsel are underpaid, undersupported, and overworked. They are often paid 
flat fees or low hourly rates subject to low caps. At a rate of, say, $50 per hour subject to a 
$1,000 cap, appointed counsel receives no compensation for investing more than twenty hours in 
taking a case to trial. These rates are often below market rates and not adjusted for inflation. 
They hardly suffice to cover a law firm’s basic overhead, including rent and secretaries, let alone 
compensate counsel at anything near market rates. Funding for experts, paralegals, and 
investigators is scant. Caseloads are staggering and increasing far faster than the numbers of 
lawyers or the funding available for them. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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The longstanding problem is no secret. In December of 2004, the 
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants published a groundbreaking, comprehensive study of 
the legal representation in this area, entitled Gideon’s Broken Promise: 
America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice—written to coincide with 
the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
establishing the right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.149 As the name of 
the report suggests, the authors came to “the disturbing conclusion that 
thousands of persons are processed through America’s courts every year [] 
with . . . a lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases 
the inclination to provide effective representation.”150 Gideon’s Broken 
Promise attributed the breakdown in representation to a number of factors, 
including “shamefully inadequate” funding of public defender 
organizations and appointed counsel contract services.151 The lack of 
funding left these lawyers underpaid, without the money for experts or 
investigators and without the number of coworkers necessary to carry a 
reasonable caseload.152 
The report is a stunning indictment: “Taken as whole, glaring 
deficiencies in indigent defense services result in a fundamentally unfair 
criminal justice system that constantly risks convicting persons who are 
genuinely innocent of the charges lodged against them.”153 The risk is not 
hypothetical, it is an empirical fact.154 Many wrongful conviction cases 
share a chilling similarity: the clients were represented by attorneys who 
were unable, often because they lacked the resources, to be anything other 
than constitutionally inadequate.155 Although the authors of Gideon’s 
Broken Promise conceded that the conviction of the innocent was not solely 
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, they nonetheless concluded 
that criminal defense attorneys who received good training and sufficient 
resources were crucial to preventing these kinds of injustices.156 
 
149 See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 144, at ii. The report detailed the 
American Bar Association’s findings from a series of public hearings in which thirty-two 
expert witnesses testified about the quality of indigent legal representation in twenty-two 
different states. Id. at iv. 
150 Id. at iv. 
151 Id. at 38. 
152 Id. at 16. 
153 Id. at 7. 
154 See id. at 7–28. 
155 See id. at 16.  
156 See id. passim. 
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The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon has passed and not much has 
changed. Indeed, it is arguable that the problems afflicting the delivery of 
indigent defense services are, if anything, more dire.157 The Great 
Recession of 2008, combined with sequestration—the across-the-board 
slashing of the federal budget—have deepened state and county budget cuts 
while creating a new crisis. In 2013, the federal public defender system was 
forced to lay off attorneys and staff and take other draconian belt-tightening 
measures after its funding was cut by fifty-one million dollars.158 
In light of this harsh reality, does it make sense to add a new and 
potentially time-consuming client base to defense counsel’s already over-
loaded plate? Of course, this client base consists of former clients, and, in 
some cases, the belated nature of the newly discovered evidence pointing to 
their innocence may be counsel’s fault. But is it reasonable to expect that 
prior counsel—blameworthy or not—has the resources and ability to 
navigate the thicket of federal filing deadlines, exhaustion requirements, 
and other procedural bars imposed by AEDPA?159 And while it is possible 
that defense counsel can fulfill her obligations under the Standard through 
more limited actions, there are cases in which a great deal of effort will be 
required. For example, perhaps counsel believes she can discharge her 
duties under the Innocence Standard by calling the prosecutor and relaying 
the information. But what if the prosecutor responds by demanding further 
proof before taking action? A defense attorney who truly believes in a 
former client’s innocence or wrongful conviction may feel compelled, 
under the Innocence Standard, to interview witnesses, draft pleadings, and 
take other significant actions because the stakes are so high and there is no 
one else to do it. Thus, even a single step can commit counsel to the long 
 
157 See generally Bibas, supra note 147. 
158 See Ron Nixon, Public Defenders Are Tightening Belts Because of Steep Federal 
Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/us/public-
defenders-are-tightening-belts-because-of-steep-federal-budget-cuts.html?_r=0; Press 
Release, The Constitution Project, Federal Criminal Justice Act Budget Cuts (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fed-Indigent-Defense-
Budget-Cuts-Highlights-7-16-13.pdf. In 2004, the authors of Gideon’s Broken Promise 
chose to focus on the state systems because “the federal indigent defense system . . . is 
considerably better funded and supported.” GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 144, at 
51 n.6. Now that may be less true. See Ted Robbins, Cutting Public Defenders Can Cost 
Federal Government More, NPR (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/24/214997
385/sequestration-is-costly-in-public-defenders-offices (reporting that the Federal Public 
Defender’s Office in Tucson, Arizona lost twenty-five percent of its staff as a result of the 
sequester). 
159 See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(c). 
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mile of re-investigation and re-litigation.160 
These expectations may be unreasonable for defense counsel who are 
overworked and under-resourced.161 So what changes can be made to the 
Innocence Standard to make its overarching goal of exonerating the 
wrongfully convicted more likely to succeed? This question, and other 
proposed reforms to the Innocence Standard, are addressed in Part IV. 
IV. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE INNOCENCE STANDARD 
In light of the legal, ethical, and practical concerns identified above, I 
propose specific changes to the text of the Innocence Standard and suggest 
that Standard drafters include commentary that explains how defense 
counsel can fulfill her obligations. The commentary must also state clearly 
that it is not unethical to not take all of the steps called for by the Standard 
if doing so would interfere with counsel’s primary obligation to zealously 
represent her current clients. Interference could occur if the “duty to act” on 
behalf of a former client would violate counsel’s duty of confidentiality to a 
current client. Interference could also occur if the action called for, 
particularly in the context of advising the former client of federal filing 
deadlines and other AEDPA-related issues, would be so labor intensive as 
to make it impossible for already overburdened counsel to provide adequate 
representation to current clients. To address the latter problem, I propose 
that the ABA develop a robust online training program and sample 
materials that defense counsel can access and adapt to the particular facts 
 
160 Id. at § 4–9.4(b). While the Standard also states that prior counsel can discharge the 
obligation “to act” by informing current counsel (if any) to the evidence, that option often 
will not exist, as the language of the Standard acknowledges. Id. at § 4–9.4(a). Most post-
conviction defendants do not have counsel to represent them after the conclusion of their 
direct appeal. See cases cited supra note 25. 
161 See, e.g., Tina Peng, Op-Ed., I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a 
Good Job Representing My Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken--its-unconstitutional/
2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html. Peng writes that: “The 
American Bar Association recommends that public defenders not work on more than 150 
felony cases a year. In 2014, I handled double that.” Id. Peng goes on to say: 
An unconstitutionally high caseload means that I often see my new clients only once in those 
two months. It means that I miss filing important motions, that I am unable to properly prepare 
for every trial, that I have serious conversations about plea bargains with my clients in open 
court because I did not spend enough time conducting confidential visits with them in jail. I 
plead some of my clients to felony convictions on the day I meet them. If I don’t follow up to 
make sure clients are released when they should be, they can sit in jail for unnecessary weeks 
and months.  
Id.  
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and circumstances of her case. 
A. MODIFICATIONS TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE INNOCENCE 
STANDARD 
In this section, I propose edits to the Innocence Standard. The first part 
of the Standard states that defense counsel “has” some duty to act when she 
becomes aware of material and credible evidence suggesting that a former 
client was wrongfully convicted. I would replace “has some duty to act”162 
with “may have some duty to act,” to make it clear that counsel is not per se 
unethical if she does not act for justifiable reasons. The Standard should be 
amended to make clear that the duty of confidentiality always trumps the 
duty to act. 
The Standard should also explicitly define the terms “credible” and 
“material” so that counsel has some guidance when applying these 
modifiers to the newly discovered evidence. Adopting the definition of 
material used by the Supreme Court in the context of the prosecutor’s 
disclosure obligations under the Brady v. Maryland line of cases seems 
most appropriate.163 Under that definition, evidence is material for purposes 
of mandatory disclosure “if ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’”164 Credible equates to believable,165 but believable to 
whom? It is important not to have credibility filtered through the lens of 
counsel’s already-formed opinions about an old case. Therefore, the 
Standard should define credible as worthy of belief when viewed from an 
objective factfinder’s perspective. 
In my revision, the first paragraph of the Standard would read as 
follows, with the revisions in italics: 
 
162 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a) (emphasis added). 
163 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court did not expressly define “material” in Brady 
v. Maryland. Id. at 87 (stating that a due process violation occurs where the prosecution 
suppresses evidence “material either to guilt or to punishment,” but not defining the word 
“material”); see also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The 
Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 646 (2002) (“[I]t is a little surprising 
to find that while the adjective ‘material’ is used to describe the evidence which is covered 
by the new right [from the holding in Brady], no definition of what constitutes ‘material’ is 
given.”) 
164 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
165 See, e.g., Credible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (“capable of 
being credited or believed”).     
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(a) When defense counsel becomes aware of credible and material evidence or law 
creating a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was wrongfully 
convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent, counsel may have some duty to act. 
Credible evidence is evidence that an objective factfinder would find worthy of belief. 
Material evidence is evidence that creates a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. This duty may apply even after counsel’s representation is ended. Counsel 
must consider, and act in accordance with, duties of confidentiality. The duty to act 
does not apply to former counsel if acting would require counsel to reveal privileged 
or confidential information. In that instance, defense counsel’s conduct is governed 
by Conflict of Interest Standard 4-1.7. 
B. PROPOSED COMMENTARY 
In this section, I suggest language for the commentary to the 
Innocence Standard, which has yet to be written. The commentary should 
squarely address the remaining ethical issues the Standard puts into play: 
the possibility that disclosure could result in allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and the likelihood that attorneys will lack the 
knowledge to advise former clients about the complexities of complying 
with federal habeas corpus filing deadlines under AEDPA. The 
commentary should clearly state that it is the obligation of state and federal 
governments to properly fund the training and hiring of additional lawyers 
necessary for indigent defense organizations to carry out the Standard’s 
obligations. 
With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, it is 
appropriate for the commentary to advise state bar commissions to provide 
disciplinary immunity in cases in which defense counsel’s duty to act on 
behalf of a former client also reveals her own failures of advocacy in the 
first instance. It would be counter-productive to punish defense counsel for 
falling on her sword to help a former client. Providing immunity will 
encourage more defense counsel to act on behalf of former clients, thus 
furthering the purpose of the Standard. 
There is no cure for the reputational injury that defense counsel will 
suffer if a court makes a finding of ineffectiveness. Still, eliminating the 
threat of suspension or disbarment will ensure that defense counsel can 
continue to practice law. And even if the finding is only a reprimand, it 
prevents defense counsel from sustaining yet another reputational blow. My 
proposed commentary to address this issue reads as follows: 
If the material and credible evidence or law tending to show actual innocence of a 
client or former client, or the unlawfulness of such former client’s conviction or 
sentence, was not previously discovered as the result of the fault or partial fault of 
former counsel, former counsel should reveal that fact in the course of the action he or 
she takes. Any potential disciplinary authority, including the state bar or any court 
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having any involvement in the matter, should be aware of former counsel’s prompt 
disclosure and should immunize former counsel from discipline. Other remedial 
measures should also be considered, such as removing counsel’s name and identifying 
information from public documents associated with the case. 
Another proposed aspect of the commentary would squarely address 
the Standard’s imperative that prior counsel determine all applicable 
deadlines involving the use of the newly discovered evidence, including 
federal filing deadlines, to ensure that the client’s rights are preserved. As 
explained in Part I.C, this undertaking is complicated and labor-intensive. 
The commentary should, therefore, enumerate the applicable deadlines 
under AEDPA and explain how to calculate the correct date that the statute 
of limitations expires through providing one simple example. The 
commentary should explain how, acting pro se, the client can: (1) file a 
shell petition to meet the deadline that includes the claims that have already 
been decided by the state courts as well as the unexhausted 
innocence/wrongful conviction claim; (2) seek a stay-and-abey order from 
the federal court to exhaust the newly discovered claim of 
innocence/wrongful conviction in the state court; and (3) write a motion 
seeking the appointment of counsel. 
Competently explaining each of these steps to a former client requires 
that counsel familiarize herself with the law governing these issues. As 
explained in Part I.C, most criminal defense attorneys, particularly state 
court practitioners, will have no familiarity with AEDPA and will require 
training and other assistance in getting up to speed.166 The American Bar 
Association should play an active role in counsel’s continuing legal 
education in this area by providing publicly accessible webinars that discuss 
the law of federal habeas corpus and also provide training in translating this 
dense doctrine into language that pro se former clients can grasp. Crucial to 
this task is providing defense counsel with sample materials, which she can 
adapt to the specific facts of her former client’s case. The materials should 
include an advisory letter to the former client, a sample shell petition, a 
sample stay-and-abey motion, and a sample motion to appoint counsel. The 
American Bar Association is particularly well-suited to the task of 
providing this training and these materials. Furthermore, doing so is entirely 
consistent with the ABA Division of Government and Public Sector 
Lawyers’ mission, which is to “[s]erve as a national leader in rededicating 
adherence—within our profession and within all the Nation’s justice 
 
166 See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 454 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[F]ew 
lawyers, let alone unrepresented state prisoners, will readily understand [the complexities of 
the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence].”). 
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systems—to the highest standards of professional conduct and competence, 
fairness, social justice, diligence and civility.”167 
By proposing these revisions and additions, I do not mean to suggest 
that the issues raised by the creation of an Innocence Standard for defense 
attorneys will cease to exist. I remain troubled by the specter of parity and 
by the potential for counsel’s primary obligation—zealously defending her 
current client—to be burdened or diluted by a new obligation that reinstates 
a former attorney–client relationship. Troubling, too, is the hard reality that 
state and federal governments fund indigent defense services with great 
reluctance. Asking for additional monies may well result in a flat denial, so 
that defense counsel is confronted with a new obligation but no means to 
carry it out. It is incumbent upon the ABA to provide nationwide training 
for these lawyers and to forcefully advocate for additional resources. 
On the other hand, the Innocence Standard has the potential to play an 
important role in ensuring that our criminal justice system does not put 
innocent people in prison. It also bears emphasizing that the Defense 
Function Standards promulgated by the American Bar Association are 
aspirational, not mandatory. The ABA is clearly right to insist that defense 
attorneys do their part to end wrongful convictions. Because the Standard 
encourages and inspires them to do so, it is a noteworthy and potentially 
positive development in the cannon of defense ethics. 
CONCLUSION 
The very existence of the American Bar Association’s new Innocence 
Standard symbolizes the distance traveled by the legal profession in 
recognizing and responding to the terrible problem of wrongful convictions 
in the United States. But the Standard does not speak to the broader 
implications of its imperative. The forthright, simple language suggests that 
there is nothing controversial or even contradictory about the imposition of 
an affirmative duty to act upon a trial attorney after the representation is 
ended. Yet it is both of these things. As written, the Innocence Standard 
suggests that defense counsel has an obligation to seek the truth when that 
is not and can never be her role. The absence of immunity or favorable 
treatment for former counsel who are at fault for the belated discovery of 
the new evidence will inhibit some from coming forward. And without the 
development of resources such as draft letters, pleadings, and CLE 
 
167 Mission Statement, GOV’T & PUB. SECTOR LAW. DIVISION, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/about_us/mission.html (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2015). 
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trainings, counsel staggering under the weight of excessive caseloads 
simply will not be able to comply, no matter how good their intentions. The 
modifications and targeted commentary proposed in this Article are 
intended to make the Innocence Standard a better fit—ethically and 
practically—with defense counsel’s all-important role in the criminal 
justice system. The better the fit, the greater the likelihood of compliance 
by the defense bar and the achievement of the ultimate goal: freeing the 
wrongly convicted. 
 
 
